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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Research Question and organization of the studies. 
The purpose of this thesis has a very ambitious goal. Namely, it will try to show the 
quality of the democratic regime in post_communist Poland. The task is relatively difficult 
because of the complexity of the political systems. Political scientists have been trying for 
years to test and compare qualities of different regimes° However, the multidimensional 
phenomenon of democracy limits the standardization of testing such regimes. There are 
many instruments which are commonly used in order to test the condition of a particular 
system, but there is no single and correct model which should be followed in measuring the 
quality of democracy. My thesis will develop a model which will consist of using both 
objective instruments such as indexes and indicators and public opinion which represent 
subjective side of the perception how the system works° The mix of such indicators will show 
us how the Polish democracy has developed over time, and how the perception of institutions 
and scholars specializing in testing democratization differs from the view of Polish people 
who experience the system on the daily basis. 
The modern democratization process started in 1989 and Poland has been developing 
since then both economically and politically. The process has not been smooth and uni-
directional. The fresh democracy experienced frequent changes of the governments with 
different views and perspective on where the country should go. The single process of 
democratization accompanied with different visions of where that democracy should go gives 
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us a good basis for a research and comparison of the same democracy but at different stages 
o lt. 
°The model which will be used in this thesis has both advantages and disadvantages. 
The first part of assessing the quality of democracy in Poland is based on the objective 
indexes. In this case the quality of the Polish regime might be with no major problems 
compared to other regimes. However, the second part that will involve the public opinion 
must be limited to the Polish state only. People have different perception of their systems all 
around the world. Therefore, all that can be shown here are the changes of the moods of 
public opinion over the time only in one state without the possibility to comparing it to other 
countries° However, the model might be replicated in other states using the same data (of 
course for appropriate country) for the indicator-index part of the thesis, and gathering public 
opinion data within the country which is to be tested. Also it is important to notice that public 
opinion results can be biased and people can be more skeptical and less informed about the 
issues. Therefore in general the public opinion results are less important than the objective 
indicators released by the organizations that have broad information and capability to assess 
the quality of democracy. 
The concept of the complexity of the democratic regime needs to be explained here. 
When we talk about the quality of democracy, we mean certain dimensions and aspects of 
democracy. There is no single democracy formula that can be tested. Rather there are several 
characteristics which create the concept and those are the ones which might be researched. 
Larry Diamond mentions seven aspects of democracy. There are: the rule of law, horizontal 
accountability, vertical accountability, freedom, equality, competition, participation and 
responsiveness (Diamond and Morlino, 2005: xxxix). In many democracies there are always 
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trade-offs. Some democracies can be very efficient and effective in one aspect, and weaker in 
another. Therefore, two democracies which might seem to have the same level of quality of 
their democratic regime might have different strengths in the aspects mentioned by Diamond. 
Based on this assumption it is clear that qualities of the political systems are different even if 
we think they are similar. No democracies can have the same exact quality, simply because 
of uniqueness of the countries and their societies, institutions and even culture. Therefore, the 
goal of this thesis is not to convince the reader of the possibility to achieve one universal and 
measurable quality of democracy which should be a blind guide and mentor for everyone, but 
rather to look at the quality and its development of one specific country, which operates 
within its own democratic environment. By "own democratic environment" I mean the 
democratic reality which was developed only within Polish boundaries in Polish peoples' 
mentality based on the historic events, constant changing international relations and political 
environment, but also cultural and institutional development. This is important because 
"democracy" and the quality of democracy (whether it is bad or good) will mean different 
things in different countries. This applies to both the neighbors of Poland such as Germany or 
Ukraine and the states which are on the other side of the globe. 
How important the aspects of quality of democracy are can be seen in those 
examples: in the state where the society of that particular country desires democracy in which 
liberal values are the most crucial then the two dimensions which should be addressed are the 
rule of lave and freedom. The case is different if the society wants democracy with efficiency 
as the priority. In this case the rule of law and accountability should be the dimensions which 
are targeted. As one can see the quality of democracy might be tested from different 
perspectives. That is because several dimensions of the system allow us to select what we 
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think is necessary and right at the particular moment. However, the good democracy should 
score high in all of the dimensions, but as Diamond says it is not known and clear whether 
one dimension of democracy is easier to achieve than the other. 
In the case of Polish democracy the dimensions I will be looking at include the 
vertical accountability, horizontal accountability and the institutionalization of the party 
system° However, the features of horizontal and vertical accountability are broader in my 
thesis. They are more general and include the aspects which were mentioned by Diamond° 
They are not equal to features such as responsiveness or competition, which are part of the 
accountabilities rather then separate dimensions. Therefore, in this thesis the vertical 
accountability will include political competition and participation which according to 
Diamond "are crucial conditions" for this type of accountability. Additionally responsiveness 
will be also a part of the vertical dimension because it is also "closely related" to vertical 
accountability (Diamond and Morlino, 2005 o xxix). Finally freedom and equality will be 
included, because these are the basic requirements for any accountability whatsoever. In the 
case of horizontal accountability in this thesis I will include the rule of law, political stability 
and balance of powers. The last two call for effective rule of law because successful control 
of different institutions within the political system requires the laws which are according to 
Guillermo O'Donnell "clear, publicly known, universal, stable, nonsretroactive, and fairly 
and consistently applied to all citizens by an independent judiciary". The institutionalization 
of the party will include the qualitative description of the party system and its development in 
Poland. All of the indexes and indicators that will show the objective values of those 
dimensions will be explained in the chapter three. Chapter four will present the questions for 
public opinion which also test those dimensions but in more subjective way. 
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However, before I will get to the empirical testing of the quality of democracy I 
would like to explain the terms which are broadly used in this thesis. Those definitions are 
necessary for the readers to know what is meant when particular terms are used in this work. 
In the second chapter I will go into a short historic description of the evolution of the Polish 
political system° The main goal of this part is to show the road to democracy in Poland. This 
is crucial, because understanding the difficult history of the Polish state is necessary to 
comprehend the socioeconomic and cultural changes which occurred at the beginning of 
democratization process in 1989. The final part of the chapter two will describe the political 
structures of the modern Polish state° It will provide the basic information about the system 
which was put in place by the constitution in 1992 and 1997. Chapter three will focus on 
testing the quality of the particular dimensions by using the instruments of available and 
commonly accepted indexes and indicators. Chapter four will also test the same dimensions 
by using the subjective tools of public opinion. The particular dimensions of democracy have 
a certain set of questions which were asked the public several times during the period of 
democratization in the early 199os and later stages of democracye The consistency of asked 
questions will show us how the public reacted to the same problem at different times. In the 
final chapter of this thesis I will try to conclude based on the data presented in chapters three 
and four. 
Definition of te~nls 
Before I go into the historical background and description of the operating political 
system in Poland there are several terms which need to be defined. This will give the 
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necessary meaning to the broad names. Also it will show the reader what exactly we are 
discussing. I will use the definition of democracy which is a mixture of Robert Dahl's (1971) 
concept and the one of Philippe Schmitter (2004). Democracy is a regime which includes: 
freedom to form and join organizations, freedom of expression, right to vote in free and fair 
elections, eligibility for public office, right of political leaders to compete for support, and 
alternative sources of information. As Schmitter adds it is "a regime in which rulers are held 
accountable for their actions in the public domain by citizens acting indirectly through the 
competition and the co-operation of their representatives" (Schmitter, 2004: 59). 
Vertical accountability according to O'Donnell (1993) is exercised by the citizens on 
their rulers for the actions they have made. Horizontal accountability on the other hand is 
exercised among the institutional actors. Horizontal accountability should be limited to state 
agencies and unlawful actions, however the "nonstate actors-media organizations, party 
secretaries, trade union confederations, business peak associations, lawyers' guilds, mass 
social movements, even large capitalist firms" should be part of the powers who are able to 
exercise horizontal accountability (Schmitter, 1999: 60)a "I~//Iedia, civic associations, social 
movements, and private interest groups" might also have the capability to exercise the 
vertical power, simply because of the fact that practically individual citizens are not able to 
hold their rulers accountable, and the intermediaries in the form of those groups become the 
crucial instrument in applying the vertical accountability (Stanciulescu, 2005: 8). Therefore 
the operational definitions of both concepts need to be a little bit broader for this study, 
Vertical accountability is exercised by the citizen on the rulers for the actions the latter have 
accomplished. It is directly connected with the government responsiveness. In the process the 
media play important role as a watchdog. This form of accountability includes: free and 
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regular elections which are the main part of holding the rulers accountable, equality of voting 
rights, freedom of opinion, free access to information through independent media, political 
participation and civic competence. Horizontal accountability is exercised between 
institutional actorsa This type of accountability includes: separation of powers, limited terms 
of office, rule of law, independence of j udiciary system, mutual checks and balances, 
institutional stability and balance° 
Another important concept which requires some sort of clarification is institutionalization 
of the party system. According to Samuel Huntington "institutionalization is the process by 
which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability" (Huntington, 1968). 
However, to be more specific the four dimensions of strong party institutionalization 
mentioned by Scott Mainwaring need to be introduced. Firstly, institutionalized system 
brings stability by regular pattern of party competition. Secondly, in such environment 
parties have "strong roots in society" which brings the strong attachment to the parties° The 
attached voters identify themselves with particular party and vote for it most of the time. In 
less institutionalized party system voters tend to shift and create high electoral volatility. 
Thirdly, political actors see parties as necessity in "democratic politics, even if they are 
critical of them." Finally, "in more institutionalized systems, party organizations are not 
subordinated to the interests of a few ambitious leaders. They acquire an independent status 
and value of their own" (Mainwaring and Torcal, 2005: 5). This means that politics of the 
party does not mean the politics of one persona who tend to be a maj or figure in that 
particular party at the given moment. Adding to that concept it seems to be adequate to give 
one more criterion which would describe the strong institutionalization of the party. It 
happens when the party "has a fairly detailed organizational network and in which decisions 
8 
in the party follow, at least in a formal sense, the procedures set down in its status" (Randall 
and Svasand, 1999: 9). Consequently, the internal organization of the party is crucial in 
creating the system which might be considered as institutionalized. Based on those 
necessities for highly institutionalized party system we might shortly define what the weak or 
"fluid" institutionalization is. It occurs when "systems are characterized by less regularity in 
patterns of party competition, weaker roots in society, less legitimacy accorded to parties, 
and weaker party organization, often dominated by personal leaders" (Mainwaring and 
Torcal, 2005: 6). 
Since this thesis is about to test the quality of democracy it is also necessary to define the 
term "quality". According to the Webster dictionary (2006) quality is a "degree or grade of 
excellence or worth," Therefore, many times when we think of quality we usually think of 
condition of a particular object. The same definition can be applied to a broad concept of 
democratic regime. Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino point to the "quality democracy" 
as the one that provides "a high degree of freedom, political equality, and popular control 
over public policies and policy makers through the legitimate and lawful functioning of 
stable institutions." They continue by saying that citizens, organizations and parties are able 
to "participate and compete to hold elected officials accountable for their policies and 
actions." Those citizens, organization and parties must also be capable of monitoring "the 
efficiency and fairness of the application of the laws, the efficacy of government's decision, 
and the political responsibility and responsiveness of elected officials" (Diamond and 
Morlino, 2005: xii). In short the features of quality presented above remind one of the 
features of vertical and horizontal accountability and party institutionalization that I have 
operationalized in this thesis. Finally, the quality of democracy is the condition of all the 
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three concepts I will be discussing in the paper. Following that, the quality democracy on the 
other hand is when vertical and horizontal accountability and the party institutionalization 
work effectively, efficiently and satisfy the citizens and the rulers. 
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CHAPTER II. POLISH DEMOCRACY 
~-Iistorlcal Background of Democracy in Poland 
To many it might sound very surprising, but Poland is a country which has much 
longer experience with democracy than many other countries including the United States. 
Poland as a unified country came into existence in 966 when Mieszko I who came from the 
Piast dynasty converted into Christianity. He was the first official ruler of the Polish state. 
The country was developing under the Piast dynasty until 13 70 when the last king Kazimierz 
the Great from that family died. The next dynasty, which was called Jagielonian, took over 
the Polish state through the union with Lithuania and Europe witnessed the bi-national 
creation of the Polish-Lithuanian Union. The XV century was crucial for the Polish state, 
because the changes within the country included the movement towards a governmental 
system which welcomed the involvement of the people in politics. The Polish system 
guaranteed the right to one's own religious preferences and limited the powers of the king. 
This creation was called "demokracja szlachecka" which might be translated into nobility's 
democracy. As Marjorie Castle and Ray Taras noticed, it was "a democracy exercised by and 
for the nobility" (Castle and Taras, 2002: 4). This system lasted for three hundred years; 
therefore it is important to take a closer look at the organization of the country during the 
"demokracj a szlachecka". 
The basic regional, unit was a "regional assembly," a gathering of the nobility from 
the local territory. The priority of such meetings was to elect representatives for the Sejm (the 
lower branch of the parliament). The elections were based on consensus, and all participants 
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of the assembly had to agree on the candidature of a particular participants The first session 
of the Sejm was in 1493 and the ruling branches in the country were the Sejm, Senate and the 
king. The Sejm had the power to levy taxes, declare a war, grant amnesty, make treaties with 
other states, and control the king through the senators-residents. In 1505 the "nihil-novi" bill 
was passed, which meant that "nothing new" could be established or created without the 
consensus of the Sejm and Senate. Despite the laws, the king had broad powers which 
included the power to conduct foreign policy. He or she was the head of the army, and 
appointed the high-ranking civil servants and officers (including the bishops). Other powers 
consisted of the ability to introduce bills in the parliament and call for the session of the 
Sejm. The distinction between the legislative power and executive was similar to the one we 
experience today.l~Tamely, the king was the executive and the parliament had the legislative 
aut orlty. 
The system however had many flaws. The major weakness and problem with it was 
the exclusion of the non-nobility classes from the political life. Also, at that time there was 
no independent judiciary branch. The existing law was executed by nobility either 
individually or in groups. The successful functioning of the executive power depended 
widely on the general support of the public. 
The situation was getting more difficult in the XVII century. A narrow group of 
magnates was becoming very central on the Polish political stage. Those individuals 
managed to take a leading role over lower classes of nobility. The privileged position 
allowed them also to create almost independent small states within the country. The rapid 
decentralization of the state created temporary chaos. Additionally, the magnates blocked 
many important reforms. They were able to do so by controlling the local assemblies and the 
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representatives for the Sejm. The XVIII century was destructive for the nobility democracy 
in Poland° Foreign powers intervened in the domestic matters of Polish politics and economy, 
which caused a sudden decline of sovereignty. King Stanislaw August Poniatowski being 
aware of the very difficult situation, tried to initiate the necessary institutional reforms° One 
of the most important events in the history of Poland was passing the Constitution of the 3rd 
May in 1791 o This was the second document of this type in the world after the Constitution 
of the United States from 1787. However, the action came too late, which resulted in the 
complete partition of the Polish state among three invaders e Russia, Prussia and Austria. 
Poland disappeared from the world's map for 123 years until 1918. The first and very long 
experience of Poland with democracy came to an end because of the brutal intervention of 
neighboring European monarchies. 
The second period of democratic regime in Poland occurred between 1918 and 193 9 e 
US President Woodrow Wilson called in his peace plan fora "united, independent and 
autonomous Poland with free unrestricted access to the sea." The new model for the Polish 
political system was based on the French Third Republic with a relatively weak presidency 
and a strong parliament. For the first time in Polish history political parties came into 
existence. However, the political stage was overwhelmed by those organizations, and Poland 
shortly experienced frequent changeovers of the government. In 1926 General Joseph 
Pilsudski's coup suddenly ended the fresh democracy in Poland and brought more autocratic 
rulings. Pilsudski was a hero among his soldiers and the peasantry class which made up 25 
percent of the society. There was a strong middle class, whose representatives were very well 
educated. However, Poland lacked "commercial and entrepreneurial skills needed to trigger 
the socioeconomic change" and fell short of the need for "exhibiting risk taking, dynamism, 
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and innovation." Consequently Polish development fell behind other countries in Europe 
(Castle and Taras, 2002: 23). The death of Pi~sudski in 1935 woke the needs for democracy 
among the politicians. However, again it was too late and the Second World War stopped the 
process. 
After the war, Poland and other Eastern-European countries were "given" to the 
USSR ruler Joseph Stalin. The communist era lasted for almost forty five years. It seems to 
be a very short time in comparison to the history of the Polish state, but the impact of this 
period left significant marks on the Polish society. Communist leaders had an idea which was 
based on subordinating the society. The ruling party was the only one in power, and the 
external actors were forbidden from taking an active part in politics. The actions of the 
communist party towards the society were based on constant terror and different methods of 
constraints. At the same time the ties with the external world were cut to prevent the potential 
rebellious movement of the society against the system. The participation of the public in the 
mass political events and various holidays was forced, therefore creating an artificial picture 
of advanced political culture of the Polish public. Their participation was limited to passive 
actions rather than active involvement. Communist leaders aimed at creating the subject or 
deferential political culture, even though "ideology advocated a participatory one" (Castle 
and Taras, 2002: 4~). 
The central planned economy provided j obs to masses of people. There were several 
groups that supported the system because they got the best of it. The illusion of employment, 
and strong law enforcement worked at the beginning. Nevertheless, the growing economic 
instability, oppression and the brutality of the government towards people built a strong 
opposition to the communist system. The subject political culture did not work, because of 
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the Polish "individualistic and anti-authoritarian traditions" (Castle and Taras, 2002: 43). The 
society in general refused to be obedient to rulers, and the Polish values that developed over 
the centuries prevailed over the communist terror. However, the forty year period had an 
enormous impact on the daily behavior of the Poles. Facing the shortages of basic products 
such as food and clothes, Poles were forced to "arrange" things through black market, 
corruption, personal connections, underground network of smuggling and secret fleeing to 
th.e Western countries. This, next to the important Catholic values was passed to the next 
generations creating many obstacles to the future democracy in Poland. 
Communism fell in 1989 and Poland had to start the development of the democratic 
institutions from scratch; however there was no defacement of Polish values, and behaviors 
learned during communism. The Poles had to adjust to the new environment and democratic 
reality. The failure of the short democratic system of 1918-193 9 did not leave a big mark on 
Poles, but to scholars such as Samuel Huntington, Poland became the example of a "second-
try" attempt to create the successful democracy. The legacy of the partition of Poland in 
XVIII was disastrous in creating the democracy at the beginning of XX century, because of 
internal fights among the actors. The legacy of communism brings something more to the 
present era. Lamely, these are the mentality, behavior, and the new values that taught Poles 
to count only on oneself and be skeptical about the government and its actors. Also the 
necessity of "arranging" things did not disappear after the transition. Poles still feel that they 
need to rely on private connections and corruption (in case of health care) in order to get 
things done. Unfortunately, this is what the communism forced Poles to do. Before analyzing 
the features of democracy in Poland, I would like to spend some time on describing the 
modern Polish political structure of the state. 
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Political Structure of the Polish state 
The legislative branch 
The structure of the Polish political system is laid out in the Constitution adopted in 
May 1997. However, the most basic compositions were already written in the "Little 
Constitution" of 1992, which had a very temporary character. The governmental system is 
based on the Montesquieu separation of powers. The legislative branch is in the hands of the 
Sejm and Senate. The Sejm consists of 460 members elected in the proportional elections. 
The Senate consists of 100 senators, who are also elected by the people. The length of term is 
four years for both chambers. The members of the Sejm have the power to propose the bills. 
The powers of the Senate are not as extensive as those of the Sejm, The Senators might reject 
a bill or propose amendments, but the Sejm is able to ignore the Senate and decline an 
amendment with a maj ority vote. According to the politicians of the second biggest party in 
Poland, the Civic Platform, the Senate became a weak institution in which the task of 
balancing the work of the Sejm was replaced by "correcting the grammar errors of bills 
passed in the Sejm" (Referendum, 2005). Also the politicians who become the senators are 
those from the "second league", because the most important figures in Polish politics tend to 
run for the membership in the Sejm. The last argument for the weakness of the Senate is the 
deep adherence of those senators to their party of origin. The Senate, which is supposed to 
have a role of very independent supervisor and serve as the home for eminent personas, 
became a body in which the senators (the majority from the ruling party at the given 
moment) simply "follow the directions given to them by the leaders of their party" 
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(Referendum, 2005). Therefore, there are many voices, including the Civic Platform party, 
which call for abolishing the Senate and giving its function to the president. 
The Executive B~~nch 
The executive power is organized in a dualistic model, which means that is held by 
the president and the ministrym According to Zbigniew Smutek, the separation of the powers 
between those two executive bodies rests in distinguishing between the current politics which 
is run by the Council of Ministers and the general direction of foreign policy, internal and 
external security of the country which is run by the president (Smutek, 2002 0 13 6). The 
president is elected directly by the citizens and needs to obtain a maj ority of the vote. If none 
of the candidate achieves this outcome, the run-off between the two top candidates is held 
two weeks later. The term of office is five years and the presidents can serve only two terms, 
The constitution gives the president the title of the head of state and commander in chief of 
the armed forces. The specific powers of the president include the ability to appoint the prime 
minister and veto bills passed by the parliament (however, the veto may be overridden by 
three-fifths of the Sej m maj ority). He or she has the power of legislative initiation and can 
submit the controversial bills to the Constitutional Court for analysis of constitutionality. 
Additionally he/she calls the elections (which might be an "early election" in the case of 
dissolving the parliament). The president represents the country on the international stage, 
signs or invalidates international treaties. There is also specific competency in terms of the 
judiciary, where the president appoints the judges of the Supreme Court proposed by the 
National Judicial Council. Finally, he or she has the power to sign prerogatives, and 
administrative acts, which also require the approval of the prune minister. 
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The second segment of the dualistic executive power is located in the Council of 
Ministers. It consists of the prime minister who is appointed by the president, his deputies, 
and the ministers who are appointed by the president but proposed by the prime minister° The 
members of the Council of Ministers are constitutionally accountable to the Constitutional 
Court in case of infraction of the constitution. The body is also accountable legally and 
politically to the Sejm, which might grade the work of the ministry by a vote of confidences 
The role of the ministry is to implement the policies, issue the ordinances, and coordinate and 
control the work of the whole administration in the country. It passes a budget and 
coordinates its implementation. Also, it is responsible for the internal and external safety of 
the country and international relations and foreign policy. The Constitution states that council 
"carries out the domestic and foreign policies." It is important to note the difference between 
the powers of the president and foreign ministry to make foreign policy. The first one is a 
mainly symbolic figure with only specific and limited tools, whereas the latter has a broad set 
of instruments and a larger area to maneuver. At the moment (2006) there are seventeen 
ministers with different areas of specialties, and all of the ministers have their own staff. 
The Judiciary Branch 
Article 175 of the Constitution says that the judiciary system is an independent 
branch and consists of the Supreme Court, general courts, administrative courts and military 
courts. The Supreme Court supervises the activity of general courts and military courts. The 
chief of the Court is appointed by the president for six years. The rest of the members are 
also appointed by the president but they are proposed by the National Judicial Council. The 
NJC was introduced in 1989 and is responsible for maintaining the independence of the 
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courts and judges. The council is made up of the chief justice of the Supreme Court, the 
minister of justice, the chief of NJC, the persona appointed by the president, fifteen 
representatives of the judiciary, four members of the Sejm and two senators chosen by the 
respective. The important part of the judiciary system is the Supreme Administrative Court, 
which controls the public administration in terms of the lawfulness of the activity and its 
compliance with the constitution and the existing laws and policies. 
Additionally to the courts mentioned above are the Constitutional Tribunal and the 
Tribunal of State. The first has been functioning in Poland since 195 and it consists of 
fifteen judges elected by the Sejm for nine year terms of office. The primary work of the 
Constitutional Tribunal is targeted at the constitutionality of the policies, bills, and treaties 
initiated by the actors. It resolves the conflict of institutional clash over the competencies as 
well. The Tribunal of State rules in case of infringement of the constitutional powers by the 
highest officials in Poland such as the president, the Council of Ministries, the head of the 
central bank and the members of the Sejm and Senate. The Tribunal of State might also rule 
in cases where the officials use their powers and the privileges of their office for purposes 
other than those stated in the laws and policies. This body has broad powers which may 
remove someone from office, restrict his or her voting rights, and prohibit someone from 
political activities and taking any administrative or legislative positions. 
The very important role in the system of judiciary and control is that of ombudsman, 
whose position was created in 1987. The main purpose of this institution is to investigate the 
complaints of the Polish citizens, and even the foreigners. Everyone has a right to protest. 
The ombudsman is an independent official appointed by the Sejm for five years and 
accountable only to the Sejm. 
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CHAPTER III. THE CONDITION OF DEMOCRACY IN POLAND~THE INDICATORS 
Importance of indexes 
The indicators and indexes are important measurement tools which allow the 
researcher and the observer to assess the quality in an empirical and objective approach. Dirk 
Berg Schlosser claims that "some of our common tools in empirical political science, such as 
the currently available and widely used indicators of democratization and good governance, 
enable some limited but nevertheless meaningful and useful analysis of the quality of the 
political systems" (Schlosser, 2004: 51). Despite the imperfections and many critiques based 
on the methodological grounds, the available indicators allow us to create a general picture of 
the quality of the system. If we add the qualitative description of the problems which stand 
behind the "raw" numbers, we will get a more detailed representation of the system. 
For this thesis we distinguish three dimensions of democracy which will be tested for 
its quality in the post communist Poland. The indicators for the competition, participation, 
freedom, responsiveness and equality are shown for vertical accountability. The indicators of 
rule of law, balance of powers and political stability are presented for horizontal 
accountability. Finally the freedom of the media, which actually applies to both vertical and 
horizontal accountability, needs to be shown as an independent feature. The reason for this is 
that the media have the power to investigate and present any abuses directly to the people. 
Therefore, the free media are necessary to keep the politicians aware that someone is 
watching over theme Morlino states that horizontal accountability needs "independent media 
that are conscious of its civil function" (Morlino, 2002: 10). Also "efforts to subdue or 
20 
eliminate independent, critical media outlets are a common means by which incumbents try 
to vitiate both the electoral and the civic instruments of vertical accountability" (Diamond 
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Control of Corruption as a part of Rule of Law 
Stability of the elected government 
Corruption Perception as a part of Rule of Law 
Balance of powers 
e freedom of the media➢ applies to both dimensions 
Vertical Accountability 
Competition 
Competition is a necessary factor in all democracies. The political parties, which are 
the main actors in political competition and the most popular way to be a part of 
competitiveness, need to have free and lawful ground for fair contest. This is applied to equal 
access to the media and public funding. However, there are different types of democracies, 
and the structures of the electoral system vary from one state to another. Poland has a 
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proportional system, which gives easy access to political parties for the important offices. 
The beginnings of this system in Poland resulted in political and parliamentary chaos, 
because so many parties entered the Sejm and Senate in the first democratic election. ~In 1991 
the number of parties in the Sejm was 29. None of those parties managed to get more than 12 
percent of the votes. The first two parties to attain 12 percent were Democratic Union (LJI~) 
and Alliance of the Democratic Left (SLD) that got 12.31 percent and 11,98 percent, 
respectively. The next five parties managed to obtain over 7 percent of the votes. There was 
no major party at that time. 
The differences in ideologies and visions of Polish reforms divided the scene and 
decreased the chance for effective coalition. The lack of possibilities for a strong coalition 
resulted in early elections in 1993, which were held under a new rule of a 5 percent 
threshold. The effect of the new law brought "only" seven parties to the Sejm, but the 
distortions of proportionality remained. "With 34 percent of the votes wasted for the parties 
not represented in the Sejm (mostly from the right side of the political spectrum), the 
parliament elected in 1993 was perceived as not fully legitimate" (Jasiewicz, 1997). 
However, the 1997 election brought change because the "elites seemed to learn from 
the devastating effect of the 5 percent legal threshold on small parties, and they consolidated 
in broad electoral blocs cutting the effective number of electoral parties in half ' (Moser, 
1999: 7). Moser also noticed that the reason for the early disturbances in the electoral system 
and competition was the lack of strategic voting among the citizenso However, as time 
passed, the Poles learned to cast their votes strategically. On the other hand, the political 
parties learned to compete much more effectively for the ballots. In 2005, six parties 
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managed to get seats in the Parliament, but only two major parties received over 20 percent 
of the votes. 
Financing of the political parties is an important measure of the political and 
democratic competition in Poland. The rules seem to be very clear, and everyone has the 
access to that information. Sources of money cannot be hidden, and those sources include° 
membership fees, personal donations, heritage, and public money that come from the 
government treasury° Only parties which managed to receive over 3 percent of public support 
(if they ran on their own) or 6 percent in coalition are qualified for the appropriate amount. 
The fact that 3 percent is less than the threshold required for entering the parliament means 
that even parties which did not get into the legislative branch have the privileged status of 
being financed by the government. All political parties are prohibited from performing any 
business actions, except those which include selling party gadgets such as bumper stickers° 
An important section in the electoral law states that there must be no public rally to 
obtain money for any political party. The rally is understood in terms of public concerts, 
parties, and sport events organized by parties. The parties cannot obtain any funds from 
foreign companies or foreign citizens. All citizens can donate funds up to 15 times the 
minimal average salary rates in Poland in a particular year. 
The access to media is also open to every competing party. Especially in the 
presidential elections, the candidates of all participating parties have the right to be presented 
in the media. Despite the fact that the minimum of time on TV, or space in the newspapers is 
guaranteed and complied, usually the most popular candidates and parties get additional 
coverage. However, this fact is no different from United States and other well-performing 
democracies where the media behave very similarly. 
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The political competition in Poland has become much more efficient, and stable9 The 
main reason for this is the learning of strategic voting, but also the reforms of the electoral 
system that allowed minimizing the number of parties in the Parliament and stabilizing the 
work of the Sejm and Senate, where fewer parties created more efficient working coalitions. 
The important index which shows the competition is Polity IV-PARCOMPm It is an 
indicator that "refers to the extent to which alternative preferences for policy and leadership 
can be pursued in the political arena" (Marshall, 20020 25). Figure 2 shows the changes of 
PARCOMP since the transition in 1989. Since 2002 the Polish regime is "competitive" 
which means that "there are relatively stable and enduring, secular political groups which 
regularly compete for political influence at the national level; ruling groups and coalitions 
regularly voluntarily transfer central power to competing groups" (Marshall, 2002 25). 
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Sourced Marshall and Daggers 2003° Polity IV index, www. cidcYn. ujnd edu/insc~/polity, 
accessed January 2006° 
Figure 2 shows that the level of competition in the Polish system stabilized and 
improved, which is a definitely a good sign. The Czech Republic and Hungary have also 
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obtained the score of 5. Before 2002 Poland's score of 4 placed it in the "transitional" 
category, which means that "arrangements accommodate competing interests, but parochial 
interests are not fully linked with broader, general interest" (Marshall, 2002: 26). Of 
importance is that the election of 2001 brought stabilization of the electoral system and 
competition. The reason for the stabilization was the effective creation of Solidarity Electoral 
Action (AwS), an umbrella organization for a majority of the rightist parties in Poland. This 
was a major change because it was the first time since 1989 that most of the important 
rightist parties managed to find a common electoral program and decided to run under one 
platform. 
The political competition in Poland has become democratic fifteen years after 
transition from the communist state, despite the fact that the parties change very often. There 
is a great chance that the positive trend of democratic competition will endure in the future. 
Moser notices that Poles learned how to cast their votes, and that political parties learned 
how to compete for the voters. The 2001 and 2005 elections brought the same parties to the 
Sejm and Senate. This happened for the first time in the modern democratic history of 
Poland. The positive trend has a great chance to continue. 
F~eedo~ and Participati®n 
In the political system "no regime can be a democracy unless it grants all of its adult 
citizens formal rights of political participation, including the right to vote" (Diamond and 
Morlino, 2005: xvi). According to the Polish Constitution, the citizens have legal rights to 
participate in the political life, and this not applies only to voting and running for office. In 
Poland everybody who is 18, and is not prohibited by adjudication, may vote in popular 
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elections on both national and local levels. The same applies to the citizens who would like 
to run for office. The difference inheres in the age status. People may join organizations, 
assemblies and may lobby for their interest. However, before one may participate in the 
political and social life, she or he needs to enjoy freedom. Therefore, we need to analyze the 
freedoms first. 
The indicators of Freedom House show a better picture of how broad the political 
rights and liberties are in Poland. According to Freedom House, political rights "enable 
people to participate freely in the political process, including through the right to vote, 
compete for public office, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on public 
policies and are accountable to the electorate." Civil liberties "allow for the freedoms of 
expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal 
autonomy without interference from the state" (Freedom House, 2006). The organization 
creates the ranking based on asking 10 political rights and 15 civil liberties questions. The 
total number of points determines the political rights and civil liberties scale that has a rating 
of 1 through 7, with 1 representing the highest and 7 the lowest level of freedom. The 
Freedom House distinguishes also the states among the "free, partly free, and not free." The 
states that score 1 to 2.5 are considered as free; scores between 3 and 5 are partly free. 
Finally the range of 5.5 to 7 is assigned to states that are not free. 
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the Freedom House index of political rights and civil 
liberties in Poland. Poland scores a 1 on each index, indicating a free state. The political 
rights in Poland are extensive. Since 1996 Poland was given the value of one which means 
that there are free and fair elections. The main reason for the increase in the score was the 
fact that the copy of the new constitution that granted rights was ready in 1996 and waited 
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only for public referendum, which was held in May of 1997. The winners govern in Poland 
and the political life is enriched by the competitiveness of the political parties and groups° 
Free opposition is crucial, and the minority groups have "self-government or can participate 
in the government through informal consensus" (Freedom House, 2006). To give a better 
picture where Poland stands, it is beneficial to show the scores on the political rights of the 
Czech Republic and Hungary, which are the members of the European Union and the 
visegrad group (which has had a goal of deepening the process of European integration). 
Freedom House has also been giving them scores of one since the early period of transition. 
The situation is slightly different when we take civil liberties into consideration° From 
1991 to 2004 Poland scored only 2 in the area of civil liberties. The problem of slander has 
been a main issue. 








2  `~- ~ • ~ 
1 ~ ~ e ®♦ ® ~ ~ ®'
0  s ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ s ~ s 
O~ ~~ ~O O~ O~ ~ ~ O ~ ~ ~ O O O O O O°~ O°~ O°~ 00 00 00 
27 







0 r - r ~ r ~ 1 — ~ --r r ~ .. __~ e 
1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 
Source: F~eedo~n House, F~eedon~ in the world 2005, www~eedomhouse. o~g, accessed 
January 2006 
It is treated as a criminal offense; therefore the j ournalists in Poland consider it as a limitation 
on the "freedom of speech." In the reports prepared by Freedom House, the critique is 
targeted at the domestic violence which seems to be a maj or problem. According to 
Agnieszka Mrozik 6 percent of Poles experience ongoing domestic violence. About 20 
percent of people admit that they beat their children (Mrozik, 2005). However, despite those 
problems the Freedom House improved the score of Polish civil liberties to the value of one. 
Perhaps the year of Polish membership in the European Union improved the standards of 
Polish liberties equal to those of the EU. The same pattern may be noticed with the Czech 
Republic and Hungary that received the score of one after j oining the European Union. 
Freedom House explains this shift by the "greater conformity with EU human rights 
standards" (Freedomhouse, 2006). The European Union requires the country candidates to 
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close several chapters on different issues before those countries may join the EU. One of 
those chapters is to adjust the civil liberties system to the European Convention on Human 
Rights. Poland and other Eastern European countries that j Dined the EU in 2004 satisfied the 
requirements. Therefore, according to the Freedom House ratings Poland finished the year 
2005 with greater freedoms than the years before. 
The World Bank also releases different indicators which represent different 
dimensions of the governance. The Voice and Accountability index includes "a number of 
indicators measuring various aspects of the political process, civil liberties, political and 
human rights" (Kaufmann, 2003: 3). Additionally it takes into account the extent to which 
the citizens in a particular country are free to participate in the political and social life. Figure 
5 shows Poland and other countries and regions which were also scored by the World Bank. 
According to the World Bank, Poland improved very much since 1996. Its 
performance in 2004 on Voice and Accountability is better than Czech Republic (+1.03), and 
the average of Eastern Europe & Baltics (+0.63). More interesting, the performance of 
Poland in 2004 is very close to that of the United States which seems to be declining (the 
exact proportions are +1.13 to +1.23). In 1996 the United States scored +1.53 and Poland 
obtained the score of +0.99. The difference narrowed from 0.54 to 0.10 in eight year° 
Hungary received a score of + 1.16 in 2004. Its number has also changed since 1996 (+ 1.06). 
Based on this graph we see that while the Voice and Accountability is strengthening for the 
Eastern European countries, the same indicator is significantly deteriorating for Germany, the 
United States and OECD countries. Therefore, the position of Poland in terms of liberties, 
freedoms and rights to participation seems to match the indexes released by the Freedom 
House. 
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]figure 5e v®ice and Accountability, 1996-2002 
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The status of a free country indicates that there is a conducive environment and 
background in Poland for effective participation. To see whether Poles exercise that right we 
need to look at the turnout rates in parliamentary, presidential elections, and the referendums. 
Although this shows only one aspect of participation, it is necessary because the turnout rates 
show the interest of the society in the political life. Figure 6 shows the participation rates in 
the elections. 
The turnout rates have been declining for parliamentary elections and referenda, In 
19 ~ 9 when there was an election for the contracted S ej m, which means that only certain 
number of seats was available for open contestation and the rest was reserved for the 
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representatives of the post-communist party, the interest in parliamentary election among 
Poles was the highest. 
Figure 6. Participation rates in Polish elections since 1989 
Parliamentary Presidential Presidential EU Parliamentary 

























People were eager to use their rights to vote freely for the first time. On the other hand the 
participation rate in the parliamentary election in 2005 recorded the lowest mark in the 
history of the Third Republic. The main reason for such a weak turnout in the last election 
(both parliamentary and presidential) was the public's aversion and distrust to politicians 
(Markowski, 2004). This situation was caused by extensive corruption cases such as 
"Rywingate" or "Orlengate" (which will be described later in the paper), that involved high-
ranked officials within the government. Also the belief that the politicians do not respond to 
peoples' needs adds to decreasing level of participation in Poland. 
In the Czech Republic the turnout for 1990 Parliamentary election was 93 percent. In 
1998, it was 76 percent and 2002 election recorded 58 percent. This is also a declining trend 
but the general number is much higher than in Polish parliamentary elections. A similar trend 
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is noticeable in the case of Hungary, where the turnouts for Parliamentary elections were 75 
percent (1990), 69 percent (1994), 57 percent (1998), and 73 percent (2002). In 2002 the 
turnout in Hungary was very high in comparison to both Poland and the Czech Republic. 
The results are even less satisfying when we analyze the referendums and EU 
Parliamentary elections in Poland. The referendum on the Constitution of 1997 recorded a 
love turnout of 42.86 percent. The case was slightly different in 2003, when Polish citizens 
had to decide about the accession of Poland into the European Union. The outcome was 
much better, and almost 60 percent of the eligible citizens went to cast their ballots. 
However, the fact that the referendum lasted two days (Saturday and Sunday) may have had 
a major impact on the relatively good score. The turnout was 5 5 percent in the Czech 
Republic and 46 percent in Hungary. However, in those countries the citizens could vote only 
on one day. In Poland the turnout after the first day was around 17 percent. The referendum 
in 1996 on privatization did not attract many Poles (32.40 percent). 
The lowest turnout happened in 2004, when the Polish EU Parliamentary deputies 
were elected. Only 21 percent of those eligible showed up at the polling places° The editor of 
the most respected newspaper in Poland "Rzeczpospolita" said that the lower turnout 
(generally in Europe) in the EU Parliamentary elections should not be surprising because 
people are less concerned with the EU elections (Wildstein, 2004). However, in the case of 
Poland, where the rates were very low, it should be a signal for concern. It might be an 
indicator of Poles distancing themselves from the political life. Notwithstanding, the 
president at that time, Aleksander Kwasniewski, and Prime Minister Leszek Miller were part 
of the problem because they withdrew from the declaration that the EU election would be 
bonded with the parliamentary election at home (Wildstein, 2004). That caused the apathy 
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among Poles and resulted in very low turnout. The Czech Republic and Hungary also 
experienced lower turnouts but they were higher than Polish results. In the Czech Republic 
the election attracted 28 percent, and in Hungary it was 3 8.47 percent. In Lithuania around 48 
percent of people voted. 
There is one tendency in the presidential election that might be noticed. Namely, the 
turnout in case of casting a ballot for the presidential candidates is always higher. This fact is 
based on the voters' direct association with the candidates. Because Poland has a 
proportional system in electing the legislative branch, people vote for the parties and the lists, 
instead of the particular candidates. In the presidential election, party affiliation also matters, 
but the more important aspect lays in the personality of the nominee. Consequently, Poles ~o 
to the election booths to choose the president more often, simply because of the fact that they 
vote for the candidate they support. They know that in case of victory, that particular 
candidate will take over the office. The political party in this case is less important. Hungary 
and the Czech Republic are parliamentary democracies, but in Slovakia the turnout in 
presidential elections is also very high, and has not gone below 70 percent since 1990. 
Based on the turnout in various elections, which seems to be declining with every 
year, the conclusion is that Polish people have become more inactive when it comes to 
political participation. Radoslaw lUlarkowski claims that such phenomenon takes place 
because more and more people reject the whole class of politicians (Markowski, 2004). The 
situation is also much harder because people with higher education tend to have the same 
thinking process. Consequently, this is a problem of the whole society and not only particular 
groups, 
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The important factor which is very helpful in showing the participation of the people 
in public and political life is the standings of the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). In 
2000 the number of the NGOs reached around 30,000, and they employed 1.1 percent of 
Polish people. In 2004 the number of NGOs increased to 52,000, which is a 73 percent boost 
in three years. NGOs are especially active in the areas of education, social services and 
culture. The number of people employed increased only to 1.2 percent, which actually points 
to the total decline, because the percentage of the employees almost did not change, whereas 
the groups almost doubled. This low number of employees is caused by the lack of stable 
funding and low salaries. Along with the growth of the number of organizations in 2004, 
NGOs experienced a 30 percent decline of their budgets (USAID, 2004). USAID releases the 
Sustainability index for NGOs around the globe, which measures the "strength and viability" 
of those organizations. Figure 7 shows the index for Poland throughout previous years. 
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Source: USAID 2004 NGO Sustainability Index for Central and East. Europe and Eurasia, 
http: //www. usaid. gov/locations/europe_eurasia/de~n~ov/ngoindex/2004/index. htm, 
accessed January 2006 
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USAID scores the NGOs on seven different dimensions, giving them values from one 
to seven, one being the best score and seven being the worst. Polish NGOs' scores dropped 
from 2 in 1998 to 2.3 in 2004, meaning that the quality, advocacy, infrastructure, financial 
independence and public image of the NGOs declined. Therefore, the increasing number of 
different associations does not go along with service, which they provide. The declining 
number of people employed in all of the NGOs mirrors the declining trend of Poles' 
participation in public and political life. In Czech Republic the index was 2.7 in 2004, which 
is a drop by 0.3 from 2000. The index of ~Iungarian NGOs was 2.6, which is also a 0.3 drop 
from 2000, but a 0.1 improvement from 2003. The employment opportunities within those 
NGOs are similar. The improvement of the quality of NGOs is noticed in Estonia, which 
obtained the score of 2.1 in 2004 comparing to 2.4 in 2000. The main activity of Estonian 
NGOs is in the area of strengthening the civil society and the success of those associations in 
the Baltic state is caused by the active support of government and the businesses (USAID, 
2004). 
An additional picture of declining participation among Poles is the rate of 
membership in the unions, which are directly pressuring both the government and the 
employers. Unions in Poland are symbolic because of their significance in abolishing the 
communist system. Therefore, membership in those movements was almost prestigious. 
However, membership in the unions has been dropping significantly over the years. In 1991 
18 percent of the adult population had membership in the unions. In 1999, the rate dropped to 
11 percent, and by 2002 to 6 percent. The declining trend may be noticed throughout Europe. 
However, according to the European Industrial Relations Observatory, the total decline in 
Poland (70 percent since 1993) is the second largest one behind Bulgaria (76.5 percent). 
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This is a crucial factor that shows that the participation even in the symbolic organization, 
which has an impact on politics, has declined iri Poland (Gardawski, 2002). 
Poland is a country where the civil liberties and political rights improved significantly 
over the years, and created a great environment for the participation in the public life. 
Unfortunately, the participation rates have been declining since 1990s. This is a trend that 
can be noticed in other Eastern Europeans countries as well, but the examples of the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia show that Polish turnout rates have been lower. This is 
unfortunate, because participation in political life is the most efficient way to hold the rulers 
accountable, especially through the elections. Therefore, that concept of vertical 
accountability and democracy in terms of participation is getting weaker in Poland. However, 
freedoms have become a strong aspect of Polish democracy fifteen years after the transition 
. rom communism. 
responsiveness 
The responsiveness of the government is crucial in the democratic regime. The reason 
for that might be logical. People would like to see their representatives in the political and 
public institution being responsive to their needs. The thought behind the process of elections 
is to choose the candidates who would implement the reforms and program that are the 
closest to one's views and ideas. One way to find out how responsive the government is to 
the public is to ask the public certain questions on that topic. This will be presented in the 
next chapter about the public opinion. For now, I would like to present some indicators 
which will show to some extent the responsiveness and effectiveness of the government in 
Poland. 
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Alina Mungiu-Pippidi writes that the citizens "are critical and not yet convinced that 
the state and the government are there to grant universal access to public goods, not to 
provide advantages to the same old profiteers" (Pippidi, 2005: 228). To see how 
redistributive and responsive the state is we have to reach for the indicators on the 
government priorities. Dirk Berg-Schlosser in his research on development of democracy in 
post-communist Europe noticed the pattern that "the longer-established and fully 
consolidated democracies use the highest share of GDP for public purposes° This can be 
taken as an indication of their stronger redistributive. . .tendencies." The best way to present 
that pattern would be by comparing the public health and education spending with military 
spending, which would be presented as a percentage of the Gross Domestic Product. 
Schlosser noticed that "the means for fully consolidated democracies are clearly the highest 
for health and education and lowest for the military" (Schlosser, 2004: 42). In Poland the 
public thinks that the unemployment is the major problem, however health care and , 
education are the important priorities that the government should be working on (CB®S, 
1998). Figure 8 represents the expenditures on those areas in Poland since the transition. 
The figure shows that Poland continues to increase spending on education. The expenditures 
on military and health care seems to be stable. Berg-Schlosser points that the best performing 
democracies tend to spend around 6.2 percent on health care, 5.6 percent on education and 
1.4 percent on military. Polish expenditures are getting closer to the best standards, but it is 
not enough to be part of the best-performing countries. It is important to look at the 
expenditures on those issues in other Eastern European countries to see hove it is different 
from Poland and from the best performing democracies. 
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Pigure 8e Expenditures as percentage of GDP in Poland, 1995-2002 
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1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
[~ Military E~enditure 2.1 2.1 2 1.9 1.9 1.8 
€~ Public Health E~enditurs 4.2 4.2 4.4 4.2 4.6 4.4 
o Public Education E~enditure 4.9 5.4 5 5 5.6 5.6 
Source: United Nations Development P~og~amme, Human Development Repot, 
httpe //hd~°. undp. o~g/statistics/data/counties. cfm?c =POL, accessed January 2006 
The Czech Republic spent 2.2 percent of its GIMP on the military in 2002. This is the increase 
from 1.8 percent in 1996. In the case of health care the ratio was 6.4 percent in 2002 
comparing to 6.9 percent in 1995. In the case of education the Czech Republic spent 4.4 
percent in 2002, and 5.4 percent in 1995° The trend has been declining, and in 2002 Poland 
spent more in the area of education, and less on military and health. The difference in health 
care is 2 percent, which is significant. Hungary, on the other hand spent 1.8 percent of its 
GDP on military in 2003. This is similar to the Czech Republic and Poland. Health care 
received 5.5 percent in 2002, which is an increase from 4.9 percent in 1995. In the case of the 
education the expenditures were 5.5 percent in 2002 and 5.8 percent in 1990. Therefore, we 
see that Poland is spending the least on health care. As a matter of fact, the only state of 
Eastern Europe that joined the European Union and spent less on health care was Latvia (3.5 
percent) . 
However, in the case of Poland it is not only the money, but the organization and 
effectiveness of the institutions. Health care is the main problem. Its effectiveness is far 
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behind other European countries and has not been reformed since the transition. Elzbieta 
Cichocka claims that the health care was the worst-functioning institution in Poland 
(Cichocka, 2000: 13 9). Therefore, Poles expected major reforms of that area (along with 
education and the retirement system) a The government of Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek tried to 
be responsive, and introduced reforms in 2000. The central issue in the reform was to 
decentralize the system, and create health funds (kasy chorych) which would be responsible 
for purchasing the medical services. Patients would also benefit from individualizing of the 
services and the ability to choose their own doctor. The only problem was that there was no 
room for private insurance. Employers and employees would contribute to the central fund 
from their own incomes, which to some extent kept the quality of services on a low level. 
However, one year later in 2001 the Social-Democrats (post-communist party SLD) 
came to power, and decided to centralize the regional health funds. This move damaged the 
reform significantly, because it brought chaos to the system. The reform had long-term goals 
and one could see the positive results in the future, but the new government did not give it a 
chance, and brought it back to the chaotic condition. Because the reform had not been given a 
chance, many hospitals and local clinics were underfinanced. 
In December 2005 there was a strike of doctors who refused to sign the contracts with 
the central health fund because of the low rates that were proposed to them. Minister of 
Health zbigniew Religa promised to raise the rates and funds for health care. However, the 
paradox in this situation inheres in the sources of that money. Religa claimed that he would 
obtain additional money from the estimated GDP growth for 2006, The danger here is that if 
the prognosis for 5 percent increase does not hold, then the money will have to be taken from 
somewhere else. This shows the ineffectiveness of the system, which lacks basic structures 
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and a plan for the future. In this case the SLD behaved irresponsibly and not responsively to 
the public, because it did not commit to the reform, which was not perfect at all, but it was 
long~termo Also even if the reform lacked important issues, it always could be corrected, 
adjusted or fixed. Instead it was completely thrown out, and the money on it was completely 
wasted. The outcome of such a move is that health care remains the Achilles heel in Poland. 
The education reform was more successful. Also the SLD which came to power a 
year after implementation began, committed to its continuance. Education in Poland remains 
free on all levels, bringing more satisfaction among Poles. The decentralization of the system 
and giving more independence to the schools to choose their curriculum contributed to better 
competitiveness among schools, especially on the high school level, which nowadays accept 
pupils based on total points earned in gymnasium. The new system and the ability to attend 
schools for free requires more spending, therefore we might notice in our figure that the 
spending on education from 2000, when the reform was implemented, increased by 0.6 
percent of GDP in 2001 to the total of 5.6 percent. 
The unemployment rate and lack of j obs are the biggest problems according to the 
public. In this case the efforts of the government have been poor since the economic and 
political transformation begun. The reason for high unemployment is the lack of effective tax 
reforms that would decrease the costs of employment. Also the current law is not "friendly" 
for the employers to hire temporary workers and creates barriers for terminating the current 
ones. In this environment the employers prefer maximizing the productivity by using the 
existent labor instead of increasing it by hiring more people. 
These cases show the responsiveness of the government is mixed. On the one hand 
there are attempts to implement the major reforms in the areas which are the most important 
40 
to the citizens. On the other hand those attempts might be suddenly stopped (as we have seen 
in the case of health care) by the new government and the opposition party, which refuses to 
commit to the long-term reforms. This is usually done because of several reasons. 
First, the new government does not want to take responsibility for the reforms which 
might not be successful in the future. Second, the new governments are usually under 
pressure from the public to get something done quickly, The speed however does not 
translate into quality and effectiveness; therefore several new short-term attempts are 
disastrous, which causes election of a new party in the next election (the effect of a cycle 
which does not seem to stop in Poland). Third, the politicians from opposite parties see only 
negativity and lack of a plan in other parties. Finally, the lack of consensus among the parties 
at this stage (when the country needs several reforms to finally start working effectively) is 
the crucial point. 
In all of the reforms across the spectrum there is too much politics and not enough 
professionalism. The politicians, who often do not have appropriate knowledge in the 
technicality of the issues, tend to think differently and rarely listen to people who know the 
areas very well. The example may be seen during the political campaigns where the party 
leaders promise many things, despite the doubts of specialists in different areas in the 
possibility of implementing those promises. However, once the politicians get elected they 
are overwhelmed with the complexity of the issues, and tend to leave the things status quo. 
This creates the environment for weak responsiveness of the government and frustration 
among the people, who in turn elect a new government every four years. Until the parties 
from all sides commit to long-term reforms, and give more discretion to the people who 
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specialize in the area, this process will continue, and Poles will lose the hope. This is already 
seen in the electoral participation rates above. 
There is another indicator that is directly related to responsiveness. Government 
Effectiveness "combines responses on the quality of public service provision, the quality of 
the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from 
political pressures, and the credibility of the government's commitment to policies" 
(Kaufmann, 2003). Theoretically, people choose the rulers with the programs that fit the 
society the best. Then those citizens expect the ruler to implement it and be responsive by 
doing what he or she promised to do. 
Figure 9 shows World Bank's Government Effectiveness for Poland and other 
regions since 1996. Based on figure 8 we notice that the Polish government's commitment to 
policies has decreased significantly since 1998. The responsiveness in Poland in 2004 was 
lower than in 1996. The highest value was recorded in 1998 when the number reached +0.86. 
That was one year after Jerzy Buzek's Solidarity Election Action (AWS) party came into 
power. This is also the time when the government announced the major reforms. However, 
the outcome of the changing governments and neglecting some of the reforms resulted in 
very poor scores in 2004 (+0.47). Another factor that contributed to significant decline of the 
score is the bureaucracy and public administration that has been growing in terms of 
personnel but did not improve its effectiveness. On top of it the spreading corruption 
decreased the perception of the effectiveness of the government. 
While Poland's score is declining the average for the Eastern European and Baltic 
countries is steadily increasing. The Czech Republic score was +0.63 in 2004, comparing to 
+0.78 in 1996. Hungary's score is similar and it was +0.68 in 2004, however it was better 
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than in 1996 when it was +0.60. Therefore, Polish effectiveness became weaker than that of 
the Czech Republic and Hungary. The scores of Germany, United States and OECD are far 
ahead from Polish achievements but also decline. However, they remain around the rate of 
1070, which is considered "fully consolidated democracy" by Berg-Schlosser (Schlosser, 
2004: 42). The Polish score is below 0.50, which is between minimal liberal democracy and 
weakly consolidated democracya In the case of the US or Germany, some features of the 
government effectiveness decline, but in general stay above the standard for good 
democracy, whereas the case of Poland shows that it dropped from weakly consolidated 
democracy status to the one that is close to the minimal liberal democracy. Therefore, we see 
that the responsiveness in Poland is experiencing major difficulties, which results in worse 
vertical accountability. 
Figure 9. Government effectiveness, 1992-2004 
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Equality 
Equality is very important in the democratic regime. For this thesis our equality 
should be limited to the narrow term of political equality; however it is not possible to 
discuss this kind without mentioning the importance of the economic and social equivalent. 
There is a significant link between economic and political equality. Dietrich Rueschemeyer 
noticed that economic inequality has a great impact on the political equivalent. He argues 
that "the wealthy can disproportionately influence how policies are made and implemented" 
(Rueschemeyer, 2005). Therefore, in practice enjoying political equality means that there 
needs to be some measure in terms of equality of wealth, Income and status. when the 
citizens experience great inequalities it leads to imbalanced power of those who control the 
concentration of wealth and those who are at the bottom (Diamond and Morlino, 2005). 
However, there is a dilemma because democracy is calling for political equality, and 
liberalizing the economy, but unfortunately capitalism is known for creating the economic 
inequalities. To balance the two is very difficult. Leszek Balcerowicz stated that political 
change alone will not bring the economic progress. He confirmed what scholars such as 
Adam Przerworski said, that there is no correlation between democracy and economic 
progress. However, "there is a correlation between the type of economic institutions, such as 
property rights or whether the economy is open or closed to the outside world" and the 
growth of the economy (Balcerowicz, 1994). Therefore, the transformation to capitalism in 
Poland was accompanied with the democratization process. 
According to economists Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufmann, the poor economic 
performance can result in greater inequality, violence, or social polarization. Fortunately, in 
the case of Poland, "solid economic growth has allowed the country to escape most of these" 
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(Castle and Taras, 2002: 23 5). During the communism era, the main objective of the system 
was to force the equality on the society. With the collapse of the system and transformation 
to democracy the need for equality stayed in the peoples' minds, and the political parties' 
programs, but the reality was different, and it turned out that "world trade produces benefits 
to all participants, but not in equal proportions" (Castle and Taras, 2002: 240). Therefore, 
Poland is not different than any other actors of globalization. Those who gain are present, but 
they overshadow those who do not get anything, do not have jobs, and do not get benefits as 
they did during the communist era. 
People in Poland, including some politicians, have a hard time distinguishing between 
government performance and economic performance. During the communist era it was the 
same, because the economy was planned centrally and everything was owned by the 
government. However, in a capitalist system the economic growth usually occurs outside the 
public sphere, therefore the government's role in economic performance is indirect relative to 
the communist times; but people tend to forget or not understand it. Even today the ruling 
party Law and Justice calls for economic solidarity and equality, despite the fact that it is not 
possible to redistribute the economic resources equally in the capitalist system. Therefore, 
one can see how important the link is between economic and political equality, and what sort 
of dilemma it creates. 
Equality might be perceived as an integral part of the freedoms and liberties. Poland 
is ranked high and has improved significantly since 1989; therefore one would expect 
equality to be also a strong component of the Polish regime. Poles do have equal rights 
guaranteed by the constitution. All citizens may vote and run for office if they meet certain 
age requirements. Even during the communist regime the push for equality among citizens 
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and gender was very strong. Therefore it is not surprising that class differences "have been of 
only marginal importance under the democratic system so far" (Castle and Taras, 2002° 153). 
The important issue of gender in the discussion about equality is more complex then 
one would have expected. Despite the fact that women have the same political rights, they 
are still many times expected to "sacrifice themselves for their families" (Millard, 1999 e 
121). Many times women themselves do not want to participate in the public life. Figure 10 
shows the number of seats of Polish women in the Sejm. Based on the graph we see that 
women were represented much better before 1990, which was still during the communist era. 
PIowever, this was caused by the laws which guaranteed the women 20 percent of the seats in 
the parliament 
Figure 10. ~'he percentage of Women in the Sejm, 19802005 
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Despite what the statistics show, the women did not play an important role in the Sejm, 
because of the fact that they were forced by the law to be present in it. After 1989 the 
participation in the political life of women suddenly dropped. Many blame the stereotyping 
when choosing their candidates, but very often the low participation of women was caused 
by their apathy to politics itself (rownystatus.gov.pl, 2006). However, as the figure shows 
there is a positive tendency and women do manage to get more seats, and do it because they 
want to and not because they are forced to do so. This is a very good sign; it shows that the 
participation of women increases in Poland without the intervention of the government (as it 
was before 1989). The stereotypes and the perception of the women as weak in politics are 
declining, therefore women decide to engage in the public life, and men are less skeptical 
about the women when the vote. 
The political equality has improved also in terms of access to office in Poland. The 
first reason for that is the constitution that guarantees such rights. However, it is important 
that in the early 1990s' the power was limited to those groups that participated in the 
transition and the "round table" talks. Only people who were engaged in the change of the 
system had the opportunity to be a part of the new governments. Castle and Taras notice that 
at the beginning of the democratization process the majority of the representatives were in 
their forties and fifties; however in 2001 the number of young participants increased to 23 
percent, which shows that the new generation of politicians obtains the chance to be elected 
(Castle and Taras, 2002). 
Economic equality is also important. The Gini index shows the degree of economic 
inequality in a state. It is based on the scale from 0 (absolute equality) to 100 (absolute 
lnequallty). In Poland the index rose from 31.6 in 1994 to around 34.1 in 2002. The Czech 
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Republic's index in 1996 was 25.4, but current data is not available. Hungary experienced a 
rise from 24.4 in 1996 to 26.9 in 2002. The score for Estonia reached 3 7.6 and has remained 
on this level since late 1990s. The data show that Poland experienced an increase in the 
income inequalities. According to the World Bank the increase of the index should not be 
surprising for all of the post communist states. The reason is that the "dramatic 
transformation of the big bang years would have generated winners and losers affecting the 
living standards of many" (World Bank, 2004: 9). The interesting fact is that the United 
States has been given a score of 45, which is very high in comparison to all of the mentioned 
states. 
Despite the fact that the Gini coefficient rose to 34.1 in Poland, there are still similar 
income levels in Poland especially in the occupations such as teachers, doctors, 
administrative employees, policemen, and firefighters. The reason for it is that their income 
is set by the central government. The fluctuations appear when there are differences in 
education, years of service and other factors. However, the idea is that it is up to ministries to 
set the incomes of public occupations. Those are paid similarly, and only narrow fluctuations 
occur within the salary range. 
Another important dimension of equality is the ration of men's income to women's 
income. It is related to both gender and economic equality, but this also has an impact on 
political equality. The trend is that the lower income one has, the lower his/her participation 
in the political life, therefore lower equality. Figure 11 shows the situation in Poland. There 
is still an inequality in the incomes between men and women. However, the situation has 
been improving. 
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The economic inequality has increased; especially between the richest and the poorest 
people. However, this did not seem to have a destructive impact on the political equality. One 
does not need to be part of the elite to get to the Sejm or Senate. The representatives are from 
different backgrounds, with different education and wealth. In practice however, there are 
always individuals who get their mandate just by having the economic advantage. The best 
example of this would be Piotr Misztal from the Self-Defense party. He was elected to the 
Sejm in 2005. After his election, even the leaders of the party were surprised because they 
did not know who Misztal was. He attracted the party members and voters with his great 
wealth, and there is a suspicion among other party members that Misztal simply bought his 
spot on the elector~.l list. 
The general situation of political equality in Poland seems to have improved. 
Theoretically, the more successful equality and awareness there is, the better is vertical 
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accountability. The most important news is that the equality in Poland is now in better shape 
than it was when the transition started. 
Horizontal Accountability 
Rule ®f Lam 
In a democratic country all institutions should cooperate with one another. The 
cooperation ought to be balanced and rooted in the lawful basis of the country. The rule of 
law is crucial in horizontal relations, because it allows operating in certain areas, and limits 
the institutions in such a way that they do not overuse their powers. One should also have in 
mind that rule of law might also apply to vertical accountability of democracy. However, in 
the case of the horizontal dimension the actors tend to be equal; therefore the lack of rule of 
law in the cooperation among the higher institutions affects immediately the relations 
between the society and the government. The effective and strong rule of law allows for 
controls of institutions, politicians and citizens. In short, rule of law is effective when no one 
is above the law, and the law obliges everyone. 
The first concept which applies to the rule of law is the independence of the judiciary. 
This branch of the government needs to be independent and apolitical. The decisions should 
be based on the analysis of the law and being biased is unacceptable. In the case of Poland, 
the situation of courts is difficult. Alina Mungiu-Pippidi noticed that in the last years Poland 
experienced an increase in lawsuits of different kinds, while the court structures did not 
change; also the judiciary "remained inadequately paid." All this caused the length of the 
average completion of a case to stretch many years (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2005: 217). The 
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constitution of 1997 guaranteed irremovability of the judges who would be appointed by the 
president. According to the report on the "Judiciary Independence in Poland" which was 
released in 2001, the main problem which faces the judiciary system is the continuance of 
being too deferent to the political branches and higher judges. The judges are accused of 
"entanglement of their careers with the executive away from the bench" (Guglielmo, 2001: 
313). 
The appropriate example of political involvement in the judiciary is the case that took 
place just in 2006 following the collapse of the building that killed 63 people° In 2002 the 
roof of the very same building was damaged because of the heavy snow that covered it. The 
company responsible for the building sued the insurance corporation, because the latter did 
not want to indemnify for the damages. The decision of the judge based on the opinions of 
the expert at that time ruled that the compensation must be paid. In 2006 the same roof 
collapsed because of the heavy snow. Facing the tragedy and the public opinion that 
pressured for finding the ones responsible, the Minister of Finance Zbigniew Ziobro 
criticized the verdict from 2002 and has started the disciplinary process against the judge. 
This frustrated the judiciary representatives, who claimed that the actions of Ziobro had a 
goal of satisfying the people, and finding the guilty at any price. 
However, the EU report concluded that Poland, despite many obstacles "has made 
considerable progress towards the creation of the truly independent j udiciary" (Gugliemo, 
2001 e 313). Especially the work, independence and activity of Supreme Court and 
Constitutional Tribunal are worth mentioning. Both have been successfully interpreting the 
constitution, and their rulings are respected. 
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The World Bank released the index of Rule of Law, indicating the effectiveness and 
predictability of the judiciary system. It also includes the agents' confidence in the rules of 
society. Figure 12 shows the score of Poland along with other countries and regions. 
Based on the values presented Poland's rule of law weakened and in 2004 it was +0.51, about 
0.07 lower than in 2002. Since 2000 it has been steadily declining. The Czech Republic on 
the other hand experienced the highest score (+0.69) in both 2002 and 2004. In 1996 it was 
+0.64 meaning that Czechs have been improving slightly since the World Bank initiation of 
the program. Hungary has been also improving steadily since 1996. In 2004 the score was 
+0. ~5. This is an improvement from 1996 (+0.66). 
We notice that states such as Germany and the United States have been deteriorating 
in terms of rule of law. However, the deterioration in both those cases takes place at the level 
around +1.60, which is safe for consolidated democracy (according to Berg-Schlosser). 
Poland on the other hand cannot afford to decline anymorel, because it might be threatening 
its consolidation process of democracy. Such a low value of the Polish score was caused by 
many scandals which involved high officials. For example the Ministry of Justice Barbara 
Piwnik (under Prime Minister Leszek Miller) was part of the oil scandal regarding 
privatizing the biggest company, Orlen. The next minister, Marek Sadowski, kept delaying 
the case where he was accused of causing a car accident. Once he left his office, the next 
minister Andrzej Kalwas granted him immunity. 
The Freedom House, in its publication "Nations in Transit", has been scoring 
particular countries on different dimensions since 1997. The Polish "Judicial Framework and 
' The score around +l .50 and above points to the status of "fully consolidated democracy", below +1.0 points 
to "weakly consolidated democracy", below +0.30 points to "minimal liberal democracy", below 0 "electoral 
democracy", -1.0 and below is non-democracy. 
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Independence" has been given a score of 1.50 (out of seven, where one is the highest and 
seven the lowest) until 2004. In 2005 the score was increased to 2.0 meaning that the 
judiciary system has weakened. The Freedom House explained the change as due to the 
increasing ineffectiveness of the judiciary, the slow process of bringing the former 
communist leaders to justice, and the deteriorating system of prisons. 
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To compare, the Czech Republic shows consistency (records available only since 
2003) with a score of 2.50 in 2003, 2004 and 2005. The low Czech score is explained by the 
fact that the minister of justice has the power to appoint, transfer and terminate the tenure of 
the presidents and deputies of the court. Hungary also has been consistent and received the 
score of 1.75 in 2005 (same as in 1997). The better score of Hungary is caused by the 
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increasing efficiency of its courts. Therefore, the scores of World Bank and Freedom House 
indexes seem to match and point to the worsening trend of Poland's third branch of 
government. To be more precise, Freedom House considers the judiciary in Poland as the 
weakest branch of government (Nations in Transit, 2005). 
In the effective and lawful democracy, the problem of corruption should be 
minimized. Larry Diamond claimed that it should be "detected, and punished, in the political, 
administrative, and judicial branches of the state" (Diamond, 2005: xiv). The problem of 
corruption in Poland is significant. Some of its dimensions have become a part of the culture. 
The corruption among political and administrative branches is usually hidden and extensive, 
and most of them see the daily light after police or media investigations. The scandals are 
broadly presented and publicized. 
On the other hand there is a second type of corruption in Poland that is on the 
individualistic level of average citizens, involving only a large number of people. The best 
example of the latter is the problem of "envelope money" that is paid to the doctors and 
nurses by patients or their families for better healthcare. This was initiated in the 1970's; 
however the method became very popular and generally accepted in Poland. The purpose of 
paying the money was to "obtain faster and more personalized service" (Chawia and Berman, 
1998: 10). The outcome of such behavior is that, despite the free access to the health care, 
patients are expected to pay. 
Transparency International is the organization which releases the Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) every year. Figure 13 shows the CPI for Poland since 1996. 
Transparency International's index is between zero and ten, where zero is most corrupt. The 
statistics show that corruption in Poland is worsening. The declining trend in the score is also 
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a serious signal that something needs to be done to stop this threatening phenomenon. In 
2005 Poland was the most corrupt country in the European Union (Nations in Transit and 
Transparency International, 2005). The Czech Republic has been improving since its record 
low 3 0 7 in 2002. In 2005 the score was 4.3 . Hungary on the other hand obtained the score of 
5.0 in 2005. The lowest score that Hungary has ever received was 4.8 and it was in 2003 and 
2004. 
Transparency International is not the only organization which scores Poland very 
poorly in terms of corruption. Freedom House gave the country a score of 3 in 2005, the 
worst since they started the grading process. This was an increase from 2.50 in 2003 and 
2004 and from 2.25 in 1999. In this scale zero is the best and seven is the worst. 
Figure 13e Corruption Perception Index in Poland9 1996-200 
Source: T~anspa~ency International: Co~~u~tion Perception Index 1996-2005, 
http: //www. t~ans~a~ency. o~g/poi icy_and ~esea~ch/surveys_indices/cpi/2005, accessed 
January X006 
Finally, the world dank indicator, Control of Corruption, also has a declining 
tendency, as presented in ~ gore 14. The score in 2004 was the lowest since 1996. The value 
was +0.16, a drop from +0.40 in 2002. The highest score recorded was +0.49 in 1998 and 
55 
2000. For comparison the score of the Czech Republic was also the lowest in 2004 (+0.30), a 
drop from +0.59 in 1996. Hungary improved in 2004 (+0.65) from 2002 (+0.59) and 1996 
(+0.63). The United States and Germany obtained a score of +1.83 and +1.90 in 2004, which 
is an increase from 2002. Both countries have improved in comparison to 1996. The 
increasing corruption in Poland is noticed in all available indexes and is the lowest among 
discussed countries. While Poland is experiencing a decline, the average of Eastern European 
countries is improving° In 1996 it was -0.04, and in 2004 it increased to +0.07. Although 
Poland is better at controlling corruption, difference between Poland and the Eastern 
European average has narrowed from 0.45 in 1996 to 0.09 in 2004. 
figure 14o Control of Corruption, 1996-2004 
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The appropriate question would be what happened that the corruption in Poland is 
becoming so extensive? The phenomenon of corruption was also an issue during the 
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communist era. The lack of basic products forced people to use different means to get access 
to those products, therefore many justified that by the living conditions and reality at that 
time. 
In the 1990s the corruption intensified, because with the transition of economy the 
opportunities to become wealthy in a very short time occurred. This has never happened 
before, and many tried to take advantage of it by participation in the process. Therefore, the 
corruption flourished thorough the exchange of information about the privatization deals that 
were drafted by different people including politicians. People who were in power at that time 
had the advantage, because they were the ones who directly participated in the 
transformation. Castle and Taras notice that the government ministers and parliamentary 
representatives in the early 1990s purchased state-owned companies for very low prices, and 
received kickbacks on governmental contracts (Castle and Taras, 2002). Unfortunately, such 
practices did not stop after the first phase of transformation was over. The reason for that was 
the lack of effective anti-corruption actions and frequent changes of the governments that 
were followed by replacement of the members of administration. This, according to Polish 
Internal Security Agency, led to the treatment of their term as the specific time frame and an 
opportunity to get wealthy (ABW, 2006). 
Different programs such as "Clean Hands" were supposed to limit the corruption 
among businesses but failed to have an effective outcome (Castle and Taras, 2002). The anti-
corruption law lacks effective instruments that would fulfill its goal. At the same time, there 
is lack of personal responsibility among the administration members and politicians; 
therefore individuals get away with bad decisions. Internal control agencies and audits are 
also weakly organized and the tendency to ignore the maintenance of appropriate 
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documentation results in mismanagement. Average Poles have an experience on the lower 
level of corruption. Therefore they do not fully condemn the "light corruption", which is 
limited to small bribes, protectionism, or using personal contacts. This is seen especially in 
the Polish health care system and education. However, they widely disapprove of the "hard 
corruption" that takes place through financial scandals, blackmailing and high level bribery 
among politicians. 
Corrupt practices are prevalent in many areas. The privatization process is one of 
them. Governmental agencies, funds, contracts and concessions are also the features in which 
corruption spread. The Internal Security Agency points to the problem of financing the 
political parties that get undocumented financial resources from businesses and lobbyist who 
push for appropriate legislations. Lack of the instruments and more effective law, aggressive 
actions, and willingness of the politicians to fight the corruption caused this phenomenon in 
Poland to increase (ABW, 2006). 
In the last three years the scandals which involved high-ranking politicians exploded. 
The run of misfortune started with the "Rywingate" in 2002 when Lew Rywin came on 
behalf of unknown politicians to the chairman of the Agora Company-the owner of the 
biggest newspaper in Poland, "Gazeta Wyborcza." He offered the removal of a bill which 
would forbid the dual ownership of a daily newspaper and a TV station (Agora planed to buy 
one of the TV stations in Poland). The transaction had a price of $17.5 million. However, the 
editor of the Gazeta Wyborcza recorded the meeting on audio tape, and the affair became a 
mad or scan al. 
At the same time there was another disturbing case. In Starachowice, some of the 
SLD (ruling party at that time) representatives were engaged in mafia-type activities. The 
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police were planning a major raid; however the SLD councilors got a call from the Sejm and 
SLD member Andrzej Jagie~~o, who forewarned them of the action. Jagiello obtained the 
information from another SLD member, Henryk Dlugosz, and he was informed by Deputy 
Interior Minister Zbigniew Sobotka. All involved in the scandal were convicted. However, 
Zbigniew Sobotka, who was sentenced for five years, was pardoned by President Aleksander 
Kwasniewski on the last days in his office in December 2005. This was frustrating for the 
Poles, because Sobotka was a personal friend of the president, and many claim that the 
pardon was a personal matter. Another case also involved the member of the Sejm. Andrzej 
P~czak, a representative of the SLD was accused of accepting a car from businessman Marek 
Dochnal who in return obtained confidential information about the process of privatization. 
In 2006 the ruling party, Law and Justice (PiS), proposes to establish a special group 
to detect the corruption. The group would consist of trained officers who would have a broad 
range of powerso However, others claim that there is enough bureaucracy responsible for 
fighting the corruption; therefore it would be beneficial to improve the existing institutions 
instead of an introducing additional agency, which could become itself a target of favors and 
bribes. whether it is a good idea or bad, the corruption in Poland is a serious problem and a 
threat for effective democratic system. This is not only the problem of politicians and 
particular branches of the government. It is also a problem which involves average citizens, 
who are also involved in bribery. 
Unless the society understands the significance of the problem, then no law will be 
enough to overcome the situation. The society needs to be educated through massive 
campaigns that define the corruption as a pathology. However, this is difficult when the 
rulers are the ones who set the example. Along with the education there should be an 
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effective process of detecting and punishing the corrupt actors. Internal audits and controls 
should be strengthened and the members of administration and government should be 
responsible for their decisions. The Internal Security Agency points to the necessity of 
reforming the lobbying law that would clearly set the boundaries in which the lobbyists could 
operate. In the case of government contracts and privatization there should be a transparency 
and equal access to information. Any abuse would have to be detected and penalized. Finally, 
the prosecutors, judges and police officers are underpaid in Poland. If this situation is 
reversed the temptation to obtain additional profit would decline (AB~1V, 2Q06). 
The rule of law seems to be the weakest aspect of Polish democracy. The plague of 
scandals is present and the belief that one will just simply avoid the punishment and the 
responsibility for his or her action seem to be extensive. The fact that the representatives of 
the S ej m and Senate are under a shield of immunity that can be removed only in the voting 
process, adds to the "friendly" environment for the corruption in Poland. Corrupt behavior 
undermines the democracy, and diminishes the effectiveness of the system. It creates an 
environment where there is no trust toward politicians, administration and businesses. The 
lack of trust is present within the society in general and affects everybody. This leads to the 
situation in which skeptical citizens do not participate. The ones that do and vote change their 
preferences, causing voting instability. Extensive corruption leads finally to less effective 
check and balances, because the actors become corrupt themselves and have no incentive to 
control others. Therefore, if the process of weak rule of law in Poland is on the path of 
continuity, then this will be a serious threat for the democracy in the future. 
It is also important to notice that the weak rule of law is to a great extent the result of 
the communist legacy. The Polish mentality, behavior and values that developed during 
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communism have created the environment where people often take part in illegal actions 
such as patronage, clientelism, bribes and corruption in general. During communism this was 
the way for the ordinary citizens to survive the economic obstaclese However, after the 
economy stabilized with the political and economic transition, the behaviors of Poles did not 
disappear and remains a maj or obstacle for strengthening the rule of lawn 
The hope that the problem of weak rule of law and corruption would go away with 
the new generation has been misleading. The young Poles are raised in the same way as their 
parents, and instead of trying to change the system, by not taking part in the corrupted 
practices, they decide to follow the old system because the attempt to change would be too 
costly for the individual (for example limited health care or education for that individual). 
The problem of weak rule of law in modern democratic Poland is very deeply rooted in the 
values, habits, practices and almost tradition (as in health care) that were learned, acquired 
and generally accepted during the communist era. The legacy of communism is present in 
modern Poland and it will be very hard to eliminate those behaviors that are seen among 
Poles. 
Political Stability 
In a democratic regime there should be a political stability where there is no threat of 
destabilization of tYa.e government by the unconstitutional or even violent means. The 
Constitution of 1997 created the boundaries in which several institutions and political 
branches operate. If there is uncertainty whether some actions are constitutional or not, then 
the conflict is resolved by the Constitutional Tribunal. 
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In Poland stability has had many weaknesses so far, starting with the early 1990s 
when that political steadiness was threatened. This was caused by the unclear role of the 
president and the prime minister. Lech Wal~sa, who was the first elected president, had a 
goal of establishing a strong presidency and obtaining privileges of power which would 
potentially distort the balance of powers. However, the frustration of Wal~sa is understood to 
some degree, because until 1993 the parliamentary system experienced major crisis. This was 
caused by the multiplicity of the political parties in the Sejm and Senate, and lack of strong 
coalitions which would be able to push through the important legislation. The conflict is 
known as the "Bermuda triangle" involving the presidency, the Sejm and the Council of 
Ministers (Michta, 5 8 : 1998). The conflict was staved off in 1993 when the Little 
Constitution was introduced and the stability of powers was retained. 
The World Bank releases the indicator of Political Stability and Absence of Violence 
that shows the changes and falters in political stability. Figure 15 shows the index for Poland 
and other regions. The World Bank significantly decreased the score of Polish political 
stability from +0.84 in 2000 and +0.73 in 2002 to +0.3 5 in 2004. In 1996 when the World 
Bank initiated the program Poland scored +0.66. The low value in stability in 2004 is caused 
by the weakness of the rule of law and the spreading corruption, which is a great danger to 
the stability of the institutions in Poland. 
The Czech Republic's score in 2004 was +0.84, the same as in 2000, but lower than 
in 2002 (+1.07). In 1996 Czech political stability obtained +l .08, the highest in Czech 
history. Hungary's performance has been uneven but substantially higher than Poland's. In 
1996 it obtained the score of +0.79. Two years later it j umped to + 1.18. In 2004 it obtained 
+0.85; this is a drop from 2002 (+l.l 1). A very interesting trend is noticed in the case of the 
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United States. Up to 2000 the indicator has been improving and reached +1.30. However, in 
2002 there was a dramatic decline to +0.21 (below Poland). The reason fora 1.09 drop was 
the terrorist attacks on September 11th 2001. The index of political stability includes the 
possibilities of terrorist attacks and external threats to the stability; therefore even Germany 
that was not attacked, was affected in 2002. The score declined from +1.42 (1998) and +1.31 
(2000) to +1,02 in 2002 and +0.92 in 2004. Once again we see that Poland's decrease is not 
an isolated case, but its performance is below that of the Czech Republic and Hungary. As a 
matter of fact it is the lowest among the new Eastern European countries that joined the 
European Union in 2004. 
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The "Rywingate" scandal that pressured the prime minister to resign in 2003 was a 
major blow, causing instability during that time. Kwasniewski who declared early elections, 
named Marek Belka as a prime minister instead. Another problem which Poland faced was at 
the beginning of 2006; when the new ruling party PiS did not succeed with creating a 
coalition. To the great extent it was its fault, because of the reluctance to the second winning 
party Civic Platform (PO), which was initially the best candidate for coalition. The promises 
to create the coalition were disturbed by PiS's refusal to support PO's candidate for deputy of 
the Sejm marshal. Instead PiS supported Andrzej Lepper, the chairman of the populist "Self-
Defense" party. This was a very provocative move, because Lepper was convicted many 
times for his illegal actions, and the chairman of PiS (before the election) claimed that he 
would never offer any position to Lepper. In the meantime the time for passing the budget 
was running out and the vision of an early election was becoming realistic. PiS was aware 
that its minority government would not hold, therefore it offered a "stabilization pact" to the 
small parties, Self Defense and the catholic-nationalist League of Polish Families (LPR). The 
parties agreed because their public support was declining, and in the early elections they 
could not get any seats in the parliament. 
The "stabilization pact" was a controversial deal, because Self Defense and LPR were 
obliged to support all bills that PiS introduced in the Sejm; also those small parties were 
prohibited from criticizing PiS. In return LPR and Lepper's party obtained the promise of a 
"potential coalition" in the unknown future. In practice, however, they were satisfied because 
the vision of an early election went away. Unfortunately, on February 13th 2006 the President 
Kaczynski announced that he will speak on the national TV. According to the media, 
I~aczynski wanted to use his power and dissolve the parliament, because Self-Defense and 
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LPR wanted to back the opposition's bill. This would mean the breaking of the "pact." The 
planned President's appearance was scheduled for 8 pm. 
In the meantime, the leader of PiS, Jaroslaw Kaczynski met with Lepper and Giertych 
(the LPR leader) and signed an annex to the pact. Lepper and Giertych were aware that the 
new elections would mean eliminating them from the political scene. The president appeared 
on the TV after 9 pm, which meant that in the hour he changed his mind and said that he 
would not dissolve the parliament. The opposition claims that it was aset-up to force Self 
Defense and LPR to support PiS. These succeed for the PiS leader, because Lepper and 
Giertych humbly signed the treaty. Unfortunately, people were confused and the economic 
markets reacted very nervously to the situation and created unnecessary chaos. The whole 
situation provided a dangerous image that PiS desires to hold onto the power, even if it 
means breaking the electoral promises and talks with convicted politicians. On top of that, 
using the presidency to play political parties games is dangerous° The newspapers around 
Europe wrote the next day about the potential threat to the Polish democracy (Onet, 2006). 
Political stability in Poland is experiencing a crisis. There are reasons for this 
phenomenon® First the presence of a proportional system in Poland and the frequent changes 
in the electoral formulas of calculating seats has created confusion. For example the method 
used in 1991 was Hare-Niemayer without threshold. In 1993 and 1997 the method switched 
to D' Hondt formula that favors the parties that got more votes. In 2001 the seats were 
assigned according to Sainte-Lague that favors medium parties (Moser, 1999). The change in 
the electorate formula was broadly supported by the ruling (1997-2001) Solidarity Election 
Action (AWS) that lost popularity and was afraid that the D'Hondt method would increase 
post-communist Alliance of the Democratic Left (SLD) chances of gaining absolute majority. 
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As it turned out that is what happened and SLD was short of majority in the Sejm. In 2005 
the method used was D'Hondt. Adjusting the formula for the political gains of particular 
party is a concern for increasing instability. 
Another important reason for occurrence of political instability in Poland is the 
number of parties and the lack of their effectiveness. Just between 1991 and 2000 there were 
eight governments, despite the fact that there were only three elections held for the 
parliament. The overwhelming number of parties is presented by Radoslaw Markowski who 
calculated the value of Rae's index of fractionalization (Markowski, 2000). The index's scale 
is between zero and one, where zero is a homogenous party system and one represents 
absolute fragmentation of the political parties. In 1991 the index was 0.92, in 1993 it was 
0.90, and in 1997 it amounted to 0.78 (Markowski, 2000). The numbers are very high. The 
2005 election did not bring a maj ority to any party. Only four parties managed to get over 10 
percent. The outcome of such fragmentation is that PiS, which obtained only around three 
percent more votes than PO, holds the power through a minority government. Lack of stable 
support among other parties forces PiS to constantly seek temporary deals in order to push 
the bills through the Sejm. This political environment limits significantly the chances of 
implementing the electoral programs and minimizes or reduces independence of the 
administration. Lack of the current government's stability frequently raises the issue of the 
necessity for an early election. Unfortunately, current cadency is not an isolated case, 
because the political instability in Poland has been an issue since the beginning of the 
transformation. 
Therefore, the presence of political instability and its intensification causes the 
horizontal accountability to suffer. The world Bank's scores on political stability show that 
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Poland is not the only country where the quality of the feature deteriorated. However, the 
United States has different type of problems (terrorism), and actually the Czech Republic and 
Hungary outrival Poland by +0.50 which is a significant difference on a five point scale. 
~al~.nce ®f Powers 
The Polish Constitution of 1997 clearly distinguishes the branches of government and 
creates the balance among the institutions. The balance of powers was distorted during 
Wal~sa's presidency (1990-1995) because there were no clear boundaries in which particular 
branches could operate. Therefore the prime ministers and president clashed many times, 
claiming the power to specific areas. Kwasniewski' s presidency was different, mainly 
because of the differences in the personalities, but also the constitutional background which 
was established in 1992 and finally in 1997. 
According to Frances Millard, Kwasniewski "was highly conscious of system-
building imperatives." He also "played a constructive role throughout the constitution-
making process, both in Parliament and as president" (Millard, 1999 32). The conflict 
between two executive powers, that is the president and prime minister, was staved off after 
Wal~sa's term. This happened because Kwasniewski managed to cooperate skillfully. The 
other reason was that most of the time (1995-1997, 2001-2005) Kwasniewski's SLD party 
was in power, therefore minimizing the potential conflict. Even when A~VS (the rightist 
coalition) was in power from 1997 to 2001, Kwasniewski found his way to deal with the new 
government. "He resisted attempts by the government to reduce the president to a figurehead 
in foreign and defense policy." The "coalition did not warm to Kwasniewski; but it learned 
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the need to take his resources into the equation of its political calculations" (Millard, 1999: 
32). 
The balance of powers might be presented by the indicator of Polity IV, which is 
called xCONST created by Ted Robert Gurr (Marshall, 2002). The purpose of it is to show 
"the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief 
executives, whether individuals or collectivities." Additionally "such limitations may be 
imposed by any accountability groups. In western democracies these are usually legislatures" 
(Marshall, 2002: 23). The independent judiciary is also one of the controlling groups. 
Therefore XCONST presents the check and balances among various groups and institutions. 
Figure 16 presents the indicator since 1985. The last available score comes from 
2003 a The scores of XCONTS are between 1 and 7, where 7 is the "executive parity or 
subordination." It means that "accountability groups have effective authority equal to or 
greater than the executive in most areas of activity" (Marshall, 2002: 24). In the Polish case it 
means that main legislation is initiated by the Sejm. Also the executive (in this case the prime 
minister) is dependent on the accountability group and needs to keep the necessary support in 
order to remain in office. To compare, Hungary and Czech Republic have been also given a 
score of 7 since the early 1990s. 
Poland enjoys successful check and balances. However as Marshall noticed (2002), it 
also experiences "cabinet instability." Poland entered 2006 with other concerns that will 
"test" the check and balances in the near future. Namely, the new president, Lech Kuczynski, 
is a brother of the chairman of the ruling Law and Justice Party, Jaroslaw Kuczynski. The 
fact that the president already intervened in the parties games, and was on the side of the 
party of his brother, shows that the independence of the presidency can be threatened in the 
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future. Additionally, the president openly criticized PO and other parties for not cooperating 
with PiS. Such behavior has not shown the sovereignty of this president so far. 
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The three features of horizontal accountability show that Poland experiences 
difficulties. The major problem inheres in the rule of law, and especially in the problem of 
corruption. The judiciary is becoming independent, but cases of politicization occur. The 
system lacks also institutional organization. The facilities require improvement and judges 
need to limit their deference to higher political institutions and judges in higher court 
(Guglielmo, 2001). Generally the rule of law is worsening in Poland. The same is happening 
to political stability. ®n the other hand the balance of powers is a feature which improved 
over the years in Poland. This is positive sign, because deteriorating rule of law and 
extensive corruption tends to worsen the check and balances system, and this has not been a 
major issue in Poland so far. 
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Institutionalization of the Political Parties 
Institutionalization of the political party system in Poland has experienced many 
difficulties. Since the beginning of the transition the stage of political parties in Poland has 
been much divided. Many parties were created and only a few of them survive. A lot of 
platforms went through the change of names or programs, and members switched frequently. 
The significant outcome of the weak institutionalization of the system is that no ruling party 
managed to be reelected; therefore every election brought a new party to the government. 
However, it is important to mention that there have been some improvements after the 2001 
election. It is because in 2001 and 2005 the same parties got seats in the Parliament. This has 
never happened before, because parties came and went; but the last two elections showed that 
there is some sign of permanence on the political parties' stage. 
To show the process of institutionalization of the system it is necessary to define the 
ideologies and policy platforms that are represented by the most important parties. Up to 
1997 Poland experienced a great number of parties. However, most of them were ineffective 
and lasted only for months or few years. Only some of the parties were crucial for the 
development of stronger groups after 1997. On the left side of the spectrum there is Alliance 
of the Democratic Left (SLD) that was officially established in 1999 but existed since the 
early 1990s. That party evolved on the foundation of the abolished communist Polish United 
Workers Party (PZPR) and it managed to win the election in 1993 and 2001. According to 
Castle and Taras the reason for such a big success of the post-communist formation is the 
fact that SLD tend to be "unified, nothing if not pragmatic, and rich in both tangible and 
intangible assets" (Castle and Taras 118: 2002). The main ideology of the SLD is based on 
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cutting any ties with the communist past, despite the fact that many of the activists were the 
members of PZPR. SLD is asocial-democratic party. Its program is based on supporting the 
social umbrella for the people. It calls for the social equality, the right to abortion, free 
education and health care. It is against the death penalty and a professional army. SLD 
prefers the social market economy that is a type of state-interventionism. The party has been 
very active in Poland; however its program changes and is not fully stable. Castle and Taras 
notice that SLD is "not quite a political chameleon" but is "capable of completely reversing 
its foreign policy position in a few short years as well as...hot lbutton set of issues, namely, 
secular versus Catholic values" (Castle and Taras, 2002: 127). One of its program changes 
involved the issue of dissolving the Senate, which SLD supported before 2001. However 
after the party managed to get the majority of seats in that branch, it erased this point from its 
program and upset those who voted having this issue in mind. 
The parties of the right and center have had more complex patterns of development. 
They have been fragmented very deeply. Parties on the right have changed members, names 
and even political programs. The reason for such activity was that after transformation the 
movement towards freedom disappeared and the absence of a "communist enemy" split 
personalities and groups which had different visions of Poland. The Solidarity party, which 
was the main anti-communist and rightist group, split into many parts and the members could 
not find the proper spot on the political stage. Most of the small parties joined the Solidarity 
Electoral Action (AWS) that was established in 1996. AWS managed to win the 
parliamentary elections in 1997, but collapsed in 2001. The party's ideology was based on 
Christian and nationalistic values. At that time the program concentrated on working towards 
tax cuts, reform of the pension system, health care and membership in NATO and the 
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European Union. However, the conflicts within the party, spreading corruption and patronage 
caused the collapse of the group and election of SLD in 2001. AWS had a coalition with 
Freedom Party (UW) that represented a liberal view; however constant disagreements broke 
the partnership in 2000 e 
Several important figures of failed AWS and UW decided to go in different directions 
and established different political parties. Civic Platform (PO) is a party with a liberal 
approach toward the economy. It supports a flat tax, the businesses, and private 
entrepreneurship. PO also calls for a single member district electoral system and abolition of 
the Senate. The Law and Justice party (PiS) was established in 2001 by numerous members 
of AWS. The party's ideology and program are based on Catholic and conservative values 
and a traditional social order. PiS supports changing the constitution and giving more powers 
to the president. State interventionism in the economy guarantees social safety according to 
Pisa The party won 2005 elections and created a minority government. Some of the AWS 
members and Catholic parties established the League of Polish Families (LPR), which is a 
nationalistic and very conservative party. It was established in 2001 a LPR opposed Polish 
accession to the European Union. The ideology of the party includes extensive 
interventionism in the economy, protection of the pro-life policies and patriotism. 
The party, which got a lot of attention because of its leader, Andrzej Lepper, is Self-
Defense (SO). It is a populist parrty that managed to receive support from people who were 
dissatisfied with the economic transformation that followed dernocratization. Many of the 
supporters are farmers and unskilled workers. S ® supports the governmental interventionism 
in the economy, limitation of the foreign investments, and has been skeptical about j Dining 
the European Union. However, after joining the EU in May 2004, SO was very active in 
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obtaining the direct financing for the farmers. Lepper has shown a great inconsistence 
throughout his leadership, therefore SO is not a party with a clear and stable policy platform. 
The last important party on the Polish scene is a centrist Polish Peasants' Party (PSL). PSL's 
main voting public consists of farmers and agricultural employees. The program is based on 
interventionism in the economy, slowing the process of privatization, and extensive welfare. 
The party's stand on the EU was moderate, and it called for the membership only on 
the best conditions. Many Qf the parties have not managed to create and establish clear and 
stable programs yet. The frequent changes, establishments and disappearances of the groups 
are major reasons for that. However, since 2001 the same parties managed to keep the seats 
in the Parliament. Therefore, this period may be considered as very peaceful and stable in 
comparison to the earlier stage. This is a positive sign of institLitionalization process of the 
Polish parties. 
Figure 17 captures the ideologies and differences among the parties in Poland. The 
vertical and horizontal dimensions could be used to describe the major variations among the 
parties. The vertical axis represents the Catholic traditionalist versus secular stand of the 
parties. The traditionalism corresponds to the conservative and nationalistic values but also a 
fundamentalist interpretation of the Catholic philosophy. On the opposite side of the axis is 
the secular point of view that stands for ignoring traditional values and a conservative view 
of the society. Maximizing freedom is the main point of the secular position. 
The horizontal axis presents the position towards economic policy. On the left there is 
statism that relies on high-level governmental interventionism. On the right side there is an 
economic liberalism that shapes the market. As simplistic as this figure is, it successfully 
portrays the ideological differences among the parties. 
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Another important feature important for the institutionalization of the party system is 
the internal organization of the parties. All of the parties have bylaws that describe the rules 
and operations. The structure of the parties is hierarchical, and despite the democratic rules 
within the parties, the leaders have a strong decision making powers. For example LPR's 
members were highly dissatisfied with the leader Roman Giertych's individual approach. In 
the 1990s the only party that represented a high level of organization was SLD. The party 
transferred all assets from PZPR along with the organizational skills. But it managed to unify 
and adjust to the new democratic environment. 















S'ou~ce: Adapted f~on~ Castle and Ta~as, "Dejnoc~acy in Poland ", Figure 4.1, page 114. 
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The nonideological pragmatism resulted in gaining a wide support of various groups of 
society° On top of this SLD is also an example of a party where internal struggles take place 
behind the closed door. The parties of the right and center experienced serious difficulties 
with internal organization. However, the politicians who switched the platforms learned and 
since 2001 the new parties became much more professional and organized. 
The main problem of the Polish political party system is the volatility. Volatility is an 
"aggregate turnover from one party to others, from one election to the next" (Mainwaring 
and Torcal, 2005: 6). No party since 1989 managed to maintain a stable percentage of the 
vote. For example the most institutionalized SLD obtained 12 percent in 1991, 20.4 percent 
in 1993, 27.13 percent in 1997, 41 percent in 2001, and 11.31 percent in 2005. Every election 
brought a change to the shape of the Sejm and Senate and no party was reelected to rule. The 
internal destabilization of the right and frequent changes of the party names, as well as 
members' mobility added to high volatility. 
Figure 18 presents the volatility rates of several countries. For Poland the mean 
volatility was calculated for elections until 2001. The value is 46.6 for Poland, which is very 
high comparing to both the Czech Republic and Hungary (25.7 and 25.1 respectively). 
However, Estonia and Lithuania are close to the Polish score (42.4 and 49.2 respectively). It 
is important to notice that it is not surprising that the volatility inpost-communist states is 
higher than in any other countries. Elizabeth Bakke and Nick Sitter claim that it is caused by 
"weaker organizational and electoral bases" (Bakke and Sitter, 2005: 245). In the case of 
Poland the electorate was very skeptical about the political parties at first and the impact of 
the PZPR legacy increased the distrust among the people. The reason for lower volatility in 
Hungary and the Czech Republic is fast stabilization and consolidation of the center-right. 
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There is a difference among the scholars in calculating the volatility for Poland for the 1997 
election. AWS was a coalition and a bloc of several parties° Radoslaw Markowski claims that 
A~vS was a single party; therefore the score would be 19.3 percent, down from 3 4.9 percent 
in 1993 (Markowski, 2000). However, Elizabeth Bakke and Nick Sitter calculated a different 
number and it is 5 1. l percent. The data for 2001 and 2005 is not available, but 2001 elections 
brought new parties to the Sejm, therefore the value would be also very high. However, in 
2005 the results brought some stability and the same parties managed to get seats. Therefore 
it is fair to say that 2005 volatility would be much lower. Based on this assumption we can 
say that Poland has been strengthening its party system since 2001. 
Finally it is crucial to talk about party roots in society. In Poland the attachment of the 
society to particular political groups is weak. The weak institutionalization, mobile members, 
frequent birth and death of the parties unti12001 explain the lack of strong ties between the 
electorate and the political parties. Radoslaw Markowski claims that "the strength of 
association between the socio-demographic background variables and party preferences is 
declining, with one exception- the religious factor" (Markowski, 2000). However, as we 
notice the only major party (SLD) that cuts its ties with the religious values managed to win 
the parliamentary elections twice in 1993 and 2001. Therefore, Poles do not seem to care for 
the religious background of the political parties, despite the fact that around 95 percent are 
Roman Catholic. Poles tend to vote for another party in the next election because those in 
power fail to meet peoples' expectations. 
However, there is more into it. The parties in power practiced political patronage and 
corruption, which was turned into the phrase "republic of buddies." Poles wanted to stop this 
process of corrupted parties and voted for a different option with every election. 
76 
Figure 180 electoral Volatility 
Mean Electoral Volatility, Lower Elections Included For 
Chamber Volatility 
United States 3.2 1978-2002 
Australia 6.4 1980-2001 
Greece 6.9 1981-2000 
United 
Kingdom 8.2 1979-2001 
Germany 8.7 1980-2002 
Switzerland 9.4 1979-2003 
Belgium 11.5 1978-2003 
Denmark 12.2 1979-2001 
Sweden 13.5 1979-2002 
Norway 14.1 1981-2001 
Portugal 14.1 1979-2002 
Spain 16.5 1979-2000 
Netherlands 16.6 1981-2003 
Chile 16.7 1989-2001 
France 17.5 1978-2002 
Japan 18.6 1979-2000 
Taiwan 18.7 1996-2000 
Italy 22.1 1979-2001 
Colombia 22.1 1978-2001 
Mexico 22.7 1988-2000 
Brazil 24.1 1986-2002 
South Korea 24.6 1988-2000 
Argentina 24.9 1983-2001 
India 25 1980-1999 
Hungary 25.1 1990-2002 
Czech 
Republic 25.7 1990-2002 
Venezuela 31.3 1978-2001 
Ecuador 36.4 1979-1998 
Bulgaria 36.8 1990-2001 
Slovenia 38.2 1992-2000 
Bolivia 39.8 1980-2002 
Estonia 42.4 1992-2003 
PO la n d 46.6 1991-2001 
Lithuania 49.2 1992-2000 
Russia 50 1993-1999 
Peru 51.9 1980-2001 
Romania 53 1990-2000 
Latvia 58.2 1993-2002 
Ukraine 59.2 1994-2002 
Source: Mainwa~ing and To~cal: "Pasty system institutionalization and pasty theory after 
the thud wave of democratization ", page 8. Woking paper presented at the 2005 Annual 
Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Sept. ~-4, 2005. 
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However, all parties represented the same style of operating and limited the development of 
the strong ties between the party and the electorate. Markowski states that "stability of the 
social roots of party support is unlikely as long as the social structure re-shaping is under 
way" (Markowski, 2000). 
Polish society is still reshaping and it is far away from reaching the "finish line." In 
2005 there was a strong division between the young and educated electorate that preferred a 
liberal economic approach and voted for PO, and the older, less educated group that preferred 
social coverage and state interventionism in economy. This was represented by PiS, LPR and 
SO. PiS attracted many by calling for strong law and justice as well as a broad fight with 
corruption, patronage and other pathologies in administration. However, months after being 
in power, PiS showed many signs of the same practices, which give us the possible picture of 
a new party in power in 2008. 
Despite the fact that the feature of political roots in society is the weakest, it is fair to 
say that Polish political parties have been on the stabilization path since 2001. The 2005 
election with the same parties in the Sejm show that the political party system is in better 
shape than in the 1990s. The fact that the right side of the spectrum is much more stabilized 
than in 1991, 1993 and 1997 also adds to the picture of a positive trend. 
Media in Poland-a~s a part of vertical and horizontal accountability 
Since the democratization there have been many newspapers and magazines 
introduced in Poland. New private TV stations started operations and in 1997 censorship was 
abolished, However, libel and slander are considered a criminal offense, causing a restraining 
effect on the j ournalists who are scared of possible lawsuits. The major channels in Poland 
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that reach the highest number of people are still owned by the government, which does not 
plan on getting rid of them. As a matter of fact, the scandal "Rywingate" added controversy 
to the attempts of putting pressure on the private media. The new law introduced a ban on 
ownership of the major TV station and the newspaper at the same time by the same company. 
.Also it is publicly known that "the editors-in-chief are removed from their posts due to 
political factors" (OBP, 2001). The Freedom House releases its report known as the 
"freedom of the press" every year. Figure 19 shows scores for the Polish media. The scale is 
from zero to one hundred, where zero is the best and hundred is the worst. 








1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Source: Freedom house, „ Freedom of the press 1994-2005 ", www. f~eedomhouse. o~g, 
accessed January 2006 
Since 1994, media have been gaining much more freedom. 1997 brought a sudden 
change to the score of freedom of the media, because the constitution introduced "laws 
against deriding the nation and its political system" (BBC, 2006). Since then the score was 
improving again until 2004, when the Rywingate scandal occurred. In 2005 the score for 
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Poland was 20 compared to 22 for the Czech Republic and 21 for Hungary. Journalists in 
those countries have similar problems with libel and slander. Estonia is the leader in the 
region and obtained 17. Polish j ournalists are also limited and "formally restricted by the 10th
article of the press law, which states that a j ournalist must comply with the general principles 
of his/her publisher. Any violation of this provision can be a sufficient reason for dismissal" 
(OBP, 2001). 
The press in Poland seems to be in the best shape. In 1990 the government controlled 
92 percent of all daily newspapers. In 2001 there were around twenty private publishers and 
monopoly on the press disappeared. However, it is important that only five of those 
publishers control ~0 percent of the market. The TV is much more limited. There are only 
two main private channels (Polsat and TVN) that are significantly competitive with the state 
owned TVP. In the case of radio stations the government owns four stations, but the private 
stations are flourishing and becoming very competitive. TV and radio are under control of 
the National Radio and Television Broadcasting Council (KRR.iT) that has the power to grant 
and cancel licenses. The members of the council are chosen by the Sejm, Senate and 
President. This questions the independence of the media, which was noticed in the US State 
Department's Report on Human Rights Practices (1999). 
The last important fact about the media in Poland is that "only recently have Poland's 
largest newspapers and news weeklies realized that they had a part to play in exposing 
scandals" as well as conducting investigative journalism (Castle and Taras, 2002e 250). 
Major newspapers expanded the number of j ournalists, and the number actually doubled 
since 1990. As a matter of fact, joining the European Union in 2004 made the j ournalists less 
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fearful of investigating certain cases. The EU lays stress on civil rights; therefore the 
journalists have more confidence that they are protected. 
In general, media in Poland are free but the main channels need to be privatized 
because the government's ownership might be very harmful for the objectivity of the 
information. Also the possibility of punishment for libel and slander also limits the 
independence of the journalists. In 2005 the editor of the weekly "Wiesci Polickie" was 
sentenced to prison for three months. He was accused of libeling a local official in the small 
town of Police. Another editor, Jerzy Urban, is in the middle of a trial in which he is accused 
of writing an article that criticized Pope John Paul II (Freedom of the Press, 2006). ®n the 
other hand, media in Poland have had lately a great party in revealing the information about 
scandals, corruptions and other obstructionist behavior. They play an important part of Polish 
vertical and horizontal accountability. 
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CHAPTER IV. PUBLIC OPINION 
Importance of Public Upinion 
The previous chapter provided us with the objective picture of the quality of Polish 
democracy fifteen years after its transition from the communist regime. Public opinion gives 
feedback on the policies, reforms and the variety of activities which are taken by government 
and other actors. There are important weaknesses of the public opinion however. The most 
important one is that many times the public is very sensitive to changes; therefore if long-
term policies are introduced and the results are not seen right away, then people react 
negatively. The public also tends to be very skeptical about the government and the quality of 
democracy. Therefore, when we look at the public opinion we need to remember that the 
results on certain issues will be less satisfying than the objective indicators presented by a 
variety of organizations. 
Also public opinion is usually different in many countries. It is not rare that the most 
advanced democracies experience a wide critique among their citizens. For example in 
Germany in 2004, 50 percent of the people were satisfied with the way democracy was 
working (GESIS, 2006). In Poland the number in 2003 was 47 percent. Therefore we notice 
that despite the fact the all of the objective indexes show much better quality of German 
democratic features than Poland, the public opinion on democracy is similar. Consequently, 
we have to keep in mind the fact that public opinion is not the best way to show the objective 
quality of the democratic system or whatever regime of the states. 
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Walter Lipmann said about the average citizen: "He lives in a world which he cannot 
see, does not understand, and is unable to direct" (Holsti, 1996: 10). This is an exaggeration 
to a certain point. People respond according to their feelings. If they think they are not happy 
with something, then the survey will reflect such opinions. Therefore, it is worth going over 
the same features of vertical and horizontal accountabilities to see how the public differs 
from the indexes presented by an external organization. 
Vertical Accountability 
Competition 
The political competition is best represented by the competitiveness of the political 
parties. Theoretically, they have the means and resources to compete for political offices. 
Therefore, Polish democracy does not differ much from others, and when one wants to be 
elected, he or she needs to choose a party. Many times politicians in not fully 
institutionalized political party systems tend to change parties. The best example is Finance 
Minister Zyta Gilowska who represented PO in recent elections, but switched to PiS after the 
latter nominated her for a ministerial position. Health Minister Zbigniew Religa was also a 
PO member and after elections in 2005 moved to PiS. This situation is caused by the fact that 
the candidates usually choose the groups that enjoy high support at the given moment. By 
doing so the chances of being elected might increase; but such a behavior may be noticed by 
the public, and voters might not like to cast a ballot for someone who jumps from one 
platform to another just to get elected, because such behavior erodes citizens' trust. 
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Competition in Poland has evolved impressively. In 1991 there were hundreds of 
different parties with no clear goal and no resources whatsoever; therefore the electorate was 
very confused because of the extensive proliferation of the parties and their questionable 
viability. When the law about political parties changed in 1997, so did the level of 
competitiveness. The number of parties decreased and the major players that gained the most 
support started to provide professional and informative campaigns; this actually cleared out 
the stage of political parties and people finally managed to recognize the important groups. 
The campaign of 2005 was probably the most professional in the electoral history of Poland. 
However, how does the public perceive the competitiveness of the political parties`? 
The answer for this might be found in the survey which asked the public whether they see 
any competitive party which they will be voting for in the next election. The survey was 
taken by Center for Public Opinion Research (CBOS) in 2005. Figure 20 shows the 
perception of the parties is mixed. Around 43 percent think there is definitely or probably a 
competitive party which is worth casting a vote for. On the other hand, around 41 percent 
think that there is no such a party. About 16 percent answered that they do not know. 
Figure ~Oe Party coxnpetiti~eness according to the public 
®o you think thero is a cornpetetivo political party 
which you will lie voting for in the next election? 
There is probably 
a party w hick I 
w ill vote for, 16% 
29% 
Yes there is fo 
sure and I w ill 
vote for it, 14% 
I do not know , 
There is probably 
no such party, 
27% 
There is no such 
party at all, 14% 
Source: Pankowski K~zysztof, CBS, April 2005: "Jakiej pa~tii Polacy pot~zebujc~? ", 
http: //www. cbos. pl/PL/Rapo~ty/2005, htm, accessed January 2006. 
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However, ~ gore 21 shows whether it was hard for the voters to pick the party in 
2005. The numbers for 1997 and 2001 are also presented. Based on the survey we see that in 
2005 people had a harder time than in 1997 or 2001 to pick the party which .would match 
their preferences° Citizens have become much more distrustful of parties in Poland, and have 
more problems with finding the best platform for oneself. The result of the survey shows that 
despite the competition, the institutionalization of the political parties is still weak in Poland. 
This might explain why people who are still not attached to political parties find it difficult to 
pick the group, especially if all of them managed to target the electorate in the successful 
campaign through TV, radio, newspapers, billboards, posters in very professional way.l~lso, 
all major and eligible political parties managed to use all of the available governmental 
money on the campaign spending. This is a positive sign of increasing political competition 
in Poland. 
~i~ure 21 e The easiness in nicking a political par 
Do you think in this 
campaign? 
VIII 1997 VIII 2001 VIII 2005 
It is easy to p ick the 
party 
3 0 31 19 
It is hard to p ick the 
party 
52 5 8 71 
Hard to say 17 11 10 
Source: Pankowskz K~zysztof, CBS, September 2005: "T~udny wybo~ Polakow" 
http: //www. cbos. pl/PL/Rapo~ty/2005. htm, accessed January 2006. 
freedom 
The indicators show us that Poland is a country with the status of free state, where 
people enjoy civil liberties and political rights. This is significant achievement in the country 
that was under communist rule just over fifteen years ago. However, the important factor is 
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how Poles portray themselves with the freedom and liberties in their own country. Figure 22 
shows the survey of the level of freedoms in Poland. Based on the survey from 2000 we see 
that around 82 percent of Poles think that there is enough or too much freedom in Poland. On 
the one hand such a result is satisfying because the lack of freedoms is not a case in Poland. 
On the other hand it is interesting that 13 percent responded that there is definitely too much 
freedom. According to the report, the people who think that belong to the group that is less 
educated, older, and less satisfied with democracy in Poland generally, especially peasants 
and pensioners (CBOS, 2000). 
Pggu~e 22. Level of freedom in Poland 
Do you think there is too little or too much 

















Source: Roguska Peata, CBOS, 2000: "T~T~olnosc i ~ownosc w zyciu sPo~ecznym ", 
http: //ww~. cbos.pl/PL/Rapo~ty/2005. ht~n, accessed January 2006. 
The pensioners were usually raised in the communist era, where there were few 
political and social rights. with the transformation and "letting people loose" many of those 
who spent most of their lives under autocratic regime have yet to get used to the new system. 
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To compare the report in 1993 on the same topic revealed that 71 percent of Poles thought 
that there were enough or too much freedoms in Poland, 11 percent less than in 2000 (CBOS, 
1993). Consequently, we see that general trend shown in the surveys shows that freedom is a 
strong feature of Polish democracy. 
Figure 23 shows the opinions on respecting the level of the civil liberties in Poland. 
This survey shows that in 1998 over half of the Poles thought that the civil liberties were 
respected; 3 5 percent had an opinion that some of them were valued and some were not. 
However, most of the liberties which were not respected according to the respondents were 
about the rights to employment and reasonable salary. In this case the dissatisfaction is more 
a problem of economics than liberties themselves. Also people expressed their concern about 
the access to the courts, fair and fast verdicts. This points to the problems of rule of law and 
the judiciary discussed in the previous chapter. 
There is no survey about this topic from early 1990s; however in 1993, 63 percent of 
Poles thought that the Rights and Liberties' Card was necessary because it would guarantee 
respecting their rights; therefore it is fair to assume that in 1993 around 60 percent of the 
people thought that their rights are not fully respected and a new law guaranteeing freedoms 
is necessary o The Constitution of 1997 brought the new set of laws that protected Poles. More 
importantly, people for the first time obtained a constitutional power and right to appeal 
directly to the Constitutional Tribunal if the felt like their rights are not respected by the 
government or any institution within the country. We can conclude that civil liberties are a 
significant feature of Polish democracy, and perhaps improvement in that area could be 
named as the most successful achievement fifteen years after the transition. 
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Figure 23. lZespecting civil liberties and rights. 
Do you think civil liberties are respected in Poland? 









Source: OBOP, Decen~be~ 1998: "Polacy o P~awach Cz~owieka ", httP: //www. tns-
global.pl/a~chzve/yeas/1998#phead, accessed January 1 Sth 2006. 
Participati®n 
From the indexes, we noticed that there is a declining tendency in Poland when it 
comes to participation. This applies not only to the political aspect, but also social and 
professional o The participation in elections and referendums has been steadily declining. The 
quality of NGO' s has weakened, and the number of people working for them also decreased. 
On top of it, the symbol of democratization and transformation-the unions- also experience 
difficulties in keeping members active. We should look at the public opinion and see what 
causes this negative phenomenon. Many scholars try to explain the complexity of such a 
syndrome, but in this case it would be most efficient and beneficial to look at the opinions of 
average citizens and their outlook on the problem. 
Figure 24 presents the opinion about the necessity of participation in public life. The 
results show that in 2002, 76 percent of the respondents thought that it is necessary to 
participate in the public life. In 1975 and 1998 the numbers were 90 percent and 81 percent 
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respectively° The decline is explained by the fact the people in Poland tend to ignore public 
life because they are too occupied with the problems of personal life such as low income and 
high unemployment. Many people struggle with financial problems. Also, more and more 
people see that their participation in the public life does not change the reality (CBOS, 2005). 
The same report reported that only 12 percent of the people in Poland belonged to some sort 
of group or association. To compare, OBOP gave an example of Denmark where the 
percentage of people participating in such associations equals 77 percent. This is a significant 
difference; but in the Polish case it is surprising that despite the peoples' need to participate 
in the public life the reality is different, and the rates are very low. 
Figure 24o Pa~tici~ation in public life 
what do you think the average citizen should do? 
II. 1975 V.1997 V.1998 I.2002 
He/She should involve only in the 
personal and professional life. There 
should be no involvement in public life. 
7% 1 S% 13% 14% 
He/She should involve in both personal 
and public life. 
90% 77% $1 % 76% 
I have no opinion 3% $% 6% 10% 
Source: OBOP, January 2003° "Zaangazowanie Polakow w sp~awy spo~eczne a 
de~nok~acja ", l~ttp: //www. tns-global.~l/archive/yeas/2003#phead, accessed January I S 
2006. 
Figure 25 shows the public's opinion on the connection between successful 
democracy and society's participation. The lower participation of the society is explained by 
the same factor that explains the declining idea of necessity in participation. Namely, it is the 
increasing belief that participation in political and social life does not have _an impact on the 
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functioning of democracy. According to 3 9 percent, people associate democracy with 
political parties rather than different associations, groups and clubs. In 1993 the number was 
lower by 14 points. 
Figure 25o Denlocracv and ~articination in ~rouns 
There are several opinions about the connection between democracy and participation in associations 
and groupsa Which of the following opinions is the closest to you? 
VI.1993 I.2002 
Without society's participation in associations, groups and clubs, 
democracy cannot function well. 
25% 21 
Participation in different associations, groups and clubs has small 
impact on the functioning of democracy, because democracy is 
founded on political parties, and other bigger organizations. 
25% 39% 
There is no connection between participation in associations, groups 
and clubs and the functioning of democracy. 
23% 18% 
It is hard to say 27% 22% 
Sourcee OBOP, January 2003; "Zaangazowanie Polakow w sprawy spo~eczne a 
dejnokracja ", www. tns~global.pl/archive/yeas/2003#phead, accessed January 1 S 2006. 
This is significant information, because it gives a picture of the level of awareness of society 
in terms of the needs for successful democracy. The reason for increasing apathy is the 
perception of the individual's influence on the future of a country. In 1997, 42 percent of the 
respondents said that the individual has little impact on the country's affairs. The number 
increased to 56 percent in 2002. Therefore, the declining participation is explained by 
increasing doubts about the importance of individuals in democracy. The increasing doubts 
on the other hand are explained by the fact that people think of Polish democracy as a system 
of narrow elites that has the only irif'luence on the situation in Poland. Therefore, the 
individuals lose the impression of their importance in the system where "one's opinion does 
not count" (OBOP, 2005: 4). Participation in Poland has been becoming a weak feature of 
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vertical accountability, and unless there is a step in improving peoples' awareness of 
participation's necessity, the connection between the rulers and average citizen, the trend 
may keep dropping down. 
Responsiveness 
Polish people seem to think that the government does not respond to the needs of the 
citizens. This is a steady trend and does not seem to change. The declining participation may 
be the direct effect of weak responsiveness. when one votes for a party or a candidate, and 
they frequently do not hold to their promises, or he or she ignores the electorate once in 
office, then people may not see a reason why they should participate if it does not change 
anything. This is what seems to be happening in Poland. The lack of responsiveness from the 
government leaves the people with dissatisfaction and feelings of helplessness. This also 
explains the frequency of parties changing in the government. No single party was reelected 
because each did not stand up to its promises and potential. All parties that managed to be 
elected to govern promised to lower the unemployment rate, fight corruption, reform health 
care and restructure public administration. Despite some attempts, the reforms failed and for 
example unemployment and corruption spiked up because of similar practices among those 
parties. 
Figure 26 shows the opinion of Poles on the responsiveness of the politicians and 
their awareness of average citizens' problems. The graph shows that Poles are mostly 
convinced that the leaders and politicians are not aware of the peoples' problems; therefore 
they are not able to be responsive. In 2002 the negative opinion declined slightly below 70 
percent. However, this does not change the general opinion of unresponsiveness of the 
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people. The drop is always noticed when there is a change in the government, which is 
connected with peoples' hopes that the new ruling party will bring the necessary change and 
the policies which people expect. However, the passing time shows that those are only 
expectations which are not met. 
Figure 26. POlitic~ans' awareness,_ 1979x2002- -
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Sou~ceo OBOP, Feb~ua~y 2002° "Spokoj i napi~cie ", http: //www. tns-
global.pl/archive/yeas/2002#phead, accessed January 1 Sth 2006. 
In 2004 the survey was done in order to ask people which tasks should be prioritized 
for the government. The responses are found in figure 27. The unemployment rate in Poland 
is the highest in the European Union, and it stays firmly above 17 percent. Perhaps, the main 
reason for such a high unemployment rate in Poland is the high cost of employment which 
discourages the employer from hiring new people. Also maintaining the current employees is 
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very costly° On the other hand, the higher salary one gets, the more the costs in percentage 
terms the employer needs to cover; therefore the salaries in Poland are still on the relatively 
low level. 
Pigu~e 27. Public Opinion of highest gove~nn~ental p~io~ities, 2004 
Unemployment 
Economic growth (investment, lowering taxes, 
budget, eliminating the trade and investment 
barriers) 
Health Care 
Social Welfare and poverty 
Higher Salaries 
Corruption 
Pensions and retirement system 
Problems of young people 
Agriculture 


















Source: Wenzel Michas, CBOS, 2004: "P~io~ytetowe zadania dla ~zc~du Ma~ka Belki ", 
http: //www, coos. pl/PL/Rapo~ty/2005. htm, accessed January 2006. 
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Figure 28 shows the costs and taxes which the employer needs to cover and what 
percentage it is of the income. The graph illustrates that the tax burden is very heavy for the 
employers, and this has been a trend which was not changed. Therefore, the unemployment 
rate is very high, and the government does not respond to the needs, despite many promises 
and electoral slogans (Kryst, 2005). The third major problem of Poles is the condition of the 
health care systems After the reform which was stopped by SLD, the institution is 
experiencing difficulties. Also the lack of necessary change in the health field leads to the 
conclusion that the responsiveness of the government in Poland is poor. 
Egeaality 
Equality in Poland is guaranteed by the constitution and theoretically everybody has 
the same rights. People are allowed to participate, vote and join organizations on an equal 
basis. Figure 29 shows the responses when people were asked about the level of equality in 
Poland. 
Figure 29. I.,evel of equality in Poland 
IDo you thiink there is too much or too eittla acguality ir' 
F~ola nd? 








P robably too 
little 
43% 





Source: Roguska Beata, CBOS, 2000: "T~olnosc i ~ownosc w zyciu spo~ecznym ", 
http: //www. cbos. pl/PL/Rapo~ty/2005. htm, accessed January 2006. 
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In 2000, three years after introducing the new constitution, people still thought that 
there was too little equality in Poland. The total responses of "probably too little" and 
"definitely too little" total 73 percent. The graph indicates that the need for greater equality in 
Poland is still significant. Unfortunately, there is no data and survey available from the early 
1990s to show the comparison. 
The important situation is when we look at the equality of women. Figure 3 0 shows 
the opinions on the necessity of the new law which would guarantee the equality of women. 
Since 1997, the, percentage of people who felt the necessity for additional laws that would 
guarantee the equality of women increased, but about 52 percent of the people think that the 
women are not discriminated against, while 12 percent said that they definitely are. The data 
suggests that the majority thinks that women are not discriminated, but some feel that 
additional laws protecting the women's rights would be beneficial. 
Figure 30. "Do you think there is a need for a new law guaranteeing the equality of 
women or the constitutional rights are sufficient?" 
~e~,~s~r•e is ~ ~e~d far ~ ~eur b~lio T~t~ 
~EltiS`~~i~ItYi~~~ E'1i,~' ~~~ ~E'''~ t~fl'~ ~fl~i ~Gi~T~ 
Ka~,t~~r~e ~~ ~a need fir ~. T~t~ c~r~st anart 
t+i~~~~ ~r~e s i~ci~~t 
H~tyd ~ sad 
Source: Roguska Beata, CBOS, 2002: "Opinie o polityce ~zc~du wobce kobiet", 
http: //www. coos. pl/PL/Rapo~ty/2002. htm, accessed January 2006. 
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The situation is much more difficult when there is discussion about the equality of 
homosexuals in Poland. At the end of 2005, 58 percent of the people thought that the 
demonstrations or marches of such groups should not be allowed. Only 3 3 percent thought 
there should be no such equality. Some 54 percent of the respondents thought that the ban on 
the march in Poznan in 2005 was right, and only 3 5 percent thought the ban was not lawful. 
Since this problem is relatively fresh in Poland, there are no surveys available that concern 
this topic in the 1990's. 
The data show that Poles are reluctant to support such issues. I~owever, this is 
surprising, because on the one hand they think that there is not enough equality in Poland, 
and on the other hand they negate themselves when it comes to problems with certain 
minorities. In sum equality in Poland is heading in a better direction, but it is not in a shape 
which that would be acceptable for best democracies. For example in Canada about 75.6 
percent have an opinion that homosexuals should have the same rights as heterosexuals 
(Canadian Press, 2001). In 2004 the German parliament voted to extend more rights to gay 
couples and in 2001 it officially recognized the same-sex partnerships. This .indicates that 
there is a lot to be done in this area in Poland. 
~Iorizontal Accountability 
Rule ®f I~avv 
Rule of law seems to remain the weakest feature of the Polish democracy. The 
overwhelmed judiciary system, and corruption throughout the whole system, deteriorate the 
regime widely. The indexes showed us the condition of the judiciary system in Poland. 
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However, the opinion of the public is even more critical. It might be because of the fact that 
these are the citizens who themselves need to wait months and years for the access to the 
courts. Therefore their frustration might be easily understood. 
Figure 31 shows the attitudes towards the judiciary in Poland. In 1995 only 34 
percent were dissatisfied. In June 1998 the negative opinion reached 42 percent. In 2001 it 
spiked to 64 percent. The Polish judiciary experienced an even higher percentage of 
dissatisfaction in 2005, at 69 percent. 
figure 31e Attitudes towards judiciary 
~pirti~rrs ~~~sit~~~~ ©r' rreg~~~~~ a~~ut a ju~ici~r~~ ire ~o1~rr~ 
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~~i"~~ ~c~~~ ~~~~ 
,~nad 
~l~r~~ ~Q~~ ~~~~ 
~~d 
Source: St~zeszewski Michas. CBS, 2001: "~ceny o~ganow po~zc~dku I tivymia~u 
sp~awiedl iwosci ", htt~: //www. coos. pl/PL/Ra~o~ty/2002. htn~, accessed January 2006. 
The number of people who think that the judiciary does not work properly has been rising 
steadily and is explained by the increasing waiting time for the lawsuits to complete. This 
also delays opening the new cases and limits access to the courts at the same time. Spreading 
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corruption on the local levels of judiciary also added to the negative opinions about the 
judiciary in Poland. This is definitely a bad sign for this institution in Poland. 
Figure 32. Problem of corruption, 1991-2004 
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sou~cee Makowski, G~zego~z, CBS, 2004° "Post~zeganie ko~upcji w Polsce ", 
hope //www. coos. pl/PL/Rapo~ty/2004. ht~n, accessed January 2006. 
Corruption is also spreading within the network of institutions. Figure 32 presents the 
opinions about corruption in Poland since 1991. The answers of the public suggest that 
corruption is becoming a very big problem. This seems to match the indexes which were 
presented here. In 2004 the percentage of people who thought that way reached a record high 
75 percent. However, Poles are part of the corruption process. They accept parts of this 
phenomenon° The best example is the "envelope money" given to the doctors. This is a 
legacy of communist era that may be hard to squelch. Therefore it is not only problem with 
the political institutions, but it is also a problem of the whole society. There may be no 
exceptions, and in order for the democracy to work properly this abnormality has to be 
98 
eliminated. The rule of law in Poland is experiencing perhaps the biggest difficulty in the 
short history of the Third Republic. 
Political Stability 
Political stability is also experiencing difficulties in Poland according to public 
opinion. The minority governments in 2001, 2004 and 2006 present instability and lack of 
support in the Sejm. The corruption and lack of effective activity also lowers the stability. 
There is also no continuity in Poland, which is seen by the frequent changes of governments. 
Figure 33 presents the attitudes of the people towards democracy. To be more precise, it asks 
for the association of democracy with civil liberties and instability and chaos. 
figure 33v l)en~ocracy and attitudes, 1995-2005 
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With the passing of time, Poles have become more skeptical about the real outcome of a 
democratic regime. In 2005, a record high 31 percent thought that democracy is associated 
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with instability and chaos and a record low 60 percent associated democracy with civil 
liberties. This is a 12 percent drop from 1995. This seems to go along with their perception of 
the particular branches of the government. 
In 2005 Poles were asked about their attitudes toward the Sejm, Senate and president. 
In figure 34 one may notice that the negative opinions about all of the branches are 
increasing. The president enjoyed higher approval rates than the Sejm or Senate, but this also 
has been changing and the negative and positive opinions evened out at the end of 2005. In 
the early 1990s and until 1998 the positive and negative opinions about the Sejm and Senate 
were evenly distributed around 40 percent. The president enjoyed high support until 2004 
when the negative opinions started spiking. This shows that public opinion about the 
government has been very critical in recent years. One of the reasons for that is the instability 
of the political powers, and the frequent changes of ruling actors. This on the other hand 
causes lack of long-term prospects and successful reforms. 
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~Ba~ance ®f Powers 
The analysis in the previous chapter indicated that the balance of powers in Poland 
meets the standards of democracy. Every branch has its own specific limits and sQ far the 
problem (except for corruption) of exceeding these limits has not occurred. In 2005 CBOS 
surveyed Poles on the issues of the powers of the presidency. Over 59 percent of the Poles 
think that the powers of the president are too limited (figure 3 5). They would like to see an 
increase of the president's privileges. This is not surprising, especially if in 2005 according to 
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CBOS, 40 percent of the Poles thought they would prefer one strong ruling persona rather 
than a democratic regime (CBOS, 2005: 9). 
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Source: Cybulska, Agnieszka, CBOS, November 2005: "Polacy o zak~esie w~adzy 
p~ezydenta ", htt~://www. cbos.pl/PL/Rapo~ty/2005. htm, accessed January 2006. 
The same report delivered other pessimistic views of Poles. Namely, 50 percent of those 
surveyed expressed the view that "for such a person like me the type of regime (democracy 
or non-democracy) does not matter." In 1994 only 31 percent of the respondent thought that 
the powers of the president are too limited and 41 percent wanted to see an increase in the 
powers of the Sejm. Also in 1994 only 25 percent of the Poles thought they would prefer one 
strong ruling persona rather than a democratic regime (OBOP, 1994). 
Therefore we see that many Poles would actually like to see the accumulation of 
executive power fifteen years after transition. This is likely caused by the weak performance 
of political parties in the areas that they promised to improve (health care, unemployment, 
corruption, social welfare, poverty) and the idea that strong executive power would bring 
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faster solution to those problems because it would not be constrained by several political 
. actors and opposltlon. 
Institutionalization of the political parties 
People think that is hard to pick a political party that would represent one's ideology. 
As we noticed in the discussion on competition, more people had difficulty choosing a party 
during the elections in 2005 than they did in 1997. This shows the weak institutionalization 
of the political parties in the eyes of the Poles. Also the total number of people who think that 
they see a specific party which is the closest to their preferences has declined, as noticed in 
figure 3 6. In 2003 fewer people could associate with a specific party. This is a trend that 
points to the bigger skepticism among the electorate towards the parties, and greater 
confusion which could be based on the general performance of the system in Poland. 
The lack of roots of society in political parties has an impact on the absence of the 
attachment of the electorate to the political groups. For now it seems Like Poles express their 
dissatisfaction with the performance of their state and political parties, and this should be a 
signal for all the actors that something needs to be changed. Additionally, until 2001 the 
parties in Poland changed frequently leaving no room for building ties with people. At the 
end the perception of the parties as temporary groups left the negative effect on the people. 
Unfortunately, there are no surveys available from the early 1990s that asked about the 
closeness of the parties. However, based on the number of political parties in 1991 and 1993 
in the Sejm, it is fair to assume that the attachment to specific political parties was very 
weak. 
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Figure 36a Personal associations with political parties in Poland 
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CHAPTER V. COI~TCLUSIONS 
The quality of democracy requires looking at multiple features. There is no single path and a 
model to test the quality of the democratic regime. In this thesis there are three general 
dimensions which consist of several features. Five aspects are described for the vertical 
accountability, including competition, freedom, participation, responsiveness and equality. 
The three features for horizontal accountability include rule of law, political stability and 
balance of powers. The final dimension is institutionalization of the political party system. 
The first part of the thesis has presented several indexes that show the changes in the 
quality of those aspects. The second part presents the same aspects, but through the eyes of 
public opinion. The analysis indicates that some of the democracy features have improved to 
a higher quality fMifteen years after the transition from communism, On the other hand, there 
are several aspects that have declined and created barriers for achieving ahigh-quality 
democracy. Figure 3 6 summarizes each aspect and its improvement or deterioration. The 
pluses indicate that this particular feature has improved according to indexes or public 
opinion. The minuses represent a deteriorating condition. 
It is important to note that the public opinion is not as important as indexes when it 
comes to assessing objective quality of democracy. It tends to be skeptical, and results of the 
surveys can be biased because people are not experts on the issues and have limited 
information. However, for this graph I put public opinion results next to the indicators. It is 
important to notice that the developing media as well as the investigative journalism in recent 
years may have contributed to the perception of deflating democracy in Poland, especially in 
the public's eyes. Eefore the media had instruments and the capability to investigate and 
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reveal the negative sides of public, social and political life, many of those occurrences were 
hidden and unavailable to the public. However, development of the media in Poland has 
allowed them to reveal many of the illegal actions and cases, perhaps having an impact on 
the deterioration of some features ~of democracy. The best example is corruption that seems 
(from reading the media) to worsen in Poland every year. However, it is also fair to assume 
that the level of corruption in Poland was around the same ten years ago, but the media did 
not present them and those cases were hidden. Therefore, the developed media may have 
contributed to the deflating perception of quality of democracy in Poland because it shows 
the reality and the actual number of corrupted cases, and that has to have an impact on the 
general picture ~of democracy in Poland. 
The graph analysis suggests that vertical accountability of the Polish democracy has 
improved over the years even in the eyes of the public, except for the features of participation 
and responsiveness. It is fair to expect that once the responsiveness is improved, the 
participation will follow because people will see that individuals' votes and opinions matter 
and they indeed have an influence on political outcomes. Institutionalization of the political 
party system has experienced some improvements since 2001, but it is still a problematic 
area. 
A reason fmr concern is the deterioration of horizontal accountability over the years. 
The features of rule of law and political stability hamper the development of democracy in 
Poland. In this case it would also be fair to assume that once the rule of law is improved the 
political stability wflll improve. The corrupt and obstructionist practices of the politicians in 
Poland create an environment where the governments change frequently and the public 
becomes more distrustful of politicians. Once the politicians and the actors become 
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responsive to the people rather than being self-serving, and become respectful of the law, the 
public will likely respond by being more stable in choosing political options. People will then 
regain the belief that the individual is important in the democracy and will participate in the 
public life. Therefore, the weak rule of law may also affect poor participation. 
Figure 36. 
Indexes and 
Indicators Public Opinion 
vertical Accountability 
Competition + + 
Freedom + + 
Participation m 
Responsiveness 
Equality + + 
Horizontal Accountability 
Rule of Law 
Political Stability -
Balance of Powers + 
Institutionalization of the Political Party 
System + 
The questions that should be asked now are what the information and the analysis tell 
us about the condition of democracy in Poland and why we should be concerned, First of all, 
Poland cannot afford to decline more in horizontal accountability, because it is a threat for 
democracy at this stage of development. It is important to notice that the Czech Republic and 
Hungary also declined in some features, but generally scored higher than Poland. Czech and 
Hungarian participation rates are higher and the institutionalization of the political parties is 
more advanced than in Poland. Even advanced democracies such as the United States and 
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Germany experienced a decline in many features, but this is happening at the higher level of 
development, therefore not posing a threat to democracy.2
Second, the implication is that the reformers in Poland should change the agenda and 
focus on the features that experience decline and thwart further development of democracy. 
Improvement of those declining features will have a positive effect on indicators; however it 
is not sure whether the usually more skeptical public will follow. Nevertheless, the positive 
change in the quality of "hard data" that represents the change in features of democracy will 
present a better condition and eventually the public will follow. If Poland does not improve 
its rule of law and minimize corruption, then the democracy will be on the path of reversal. 
Therefore it is important to initiate reforms on a big scale that strengthen the detection, 
punishment and prevention (by appropriate laws) of the practices that involve corruption, 
patronage and clientelism. 
1~s important as the public opinion is we should be concerned with the deteriorating 
indexes more than public opinion that is sometimes uninformed. For now there are more 
improvements than declines in the indexes, which give the perception of better democracy in 
Poland fifteen years after the transition. However, this is not a reason to rest on one's laurels. 
It should be just the opposite. The features that have experienced decline are crucial for the 
successful democracy; therefore neglecting them will result in wasting the democratization 
process and risk regression. It is also important to remember that the weaker those features 
get, the more skeptical the public may become about the democracy; and as we noticed more 
people would not see a problem with abandoning democracy. Therefore, it is important to 
2 It is also important to notice that the sudden drop in the political stability of the US was caused by the terrorist 
attacks. Therefore it is an external factor rather than internal cause. 
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repel those doubts by choosing proper reforms that serve not only a specific group, political 
party or even individual, but the whole society. 
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